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Carolene Products: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Jeffrey A. Roy∗
This article proposes a game-theoretic model of the Carolene Products notion of a “discrete and insular” minority. It analyzes the democratic process as a bargaining game in which players can form coalitions
with other players. When the game is repeated, players have an incentive
to maintain a stable majority coalition to seek a long-term advantage
for themselves at the expense of an excluded minority. The article applies
this model to several issues in Equal Protection doctrine, particularly
the definition of a suspect classification. A suspect class is likely to be
formed around a trait that is a natural focal point for the formation
and maintenance of stable majority and minority coalitions. The article identifies several qualities that such a trait is likely to possess and argues that these provide a means of determining whether discrimination
based on a certain trait warrants heightened scrutiny.
I. INTRODUCTION
An important idea underlying Equal Protection doctrine is the
notion that certain groups of people are not able to rely on the democratic process to protect themselves from exploitation by a majority. This idea was articulated in the famous footnote 4 of United
States v. Carolene Products Co.:
[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and [so] may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.1

The Carolene Products approach recognizes that certain groups,
because they are in some sense separate from the political majority,
are unable to enter into coalitions with the groups forming the majority and thereby to protect their interests in the political bargaining
∗ Teaching Fellow and Instructor in Law, Stanford Law School. J.D., 1994, Stanford.
I would like to thank Richard Craswell, Pam Karlan, Mark Kelman, Jeff Strnad, and Robert
Weisberg for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
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game. This breakdown in the democratic process provides a role for
the judiciary to prevent discrimination against these groups.
Carolene Products, which involved a prohibition on the interstate
shipment of “filled milk,” was not itself an Equal Protection case.
Footnote 4 was simply intended to describe situations in which a
presumption that a statute is constitutional might be inappropriate.
The Supreme Court first referred to Carolene Products in the Equal
Protection context in a series of cases applying strict scrutiny to laws
discriminating against aliens.2 Since then, the Court has considered a
group’s status as a discrete and insular minority when deciding
whether that group is a suspect class warranting a heightened level of
scrutiny.3 However, the Court has not articulated a single test for determining whether classification based on a particular trait is suspect.
In addition to examining the effect of the trait on political power,
the Court has also asked whether the trait is immutable, whether it is
relevant to the classification’s purpose, and whether those who bear
the trait have suffered discrimination in the past.4 Much controversy
exists over the proper place of the Carolene Products analysis in this
mix, or, indeed, whether it deserves any place at all.5
This article suggests that the Carolene Products formula is a useful approach to many questions of Equal Protection law and proposes a game-theoretic model of the ways in which discrimination
can arise and be perpetuated in a democracy. The model hypothesizes that discrimination—particularly discrimination by the state—
persists to a large extent for rent-seeking purposes.6 That is, laws that
2. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971).
3. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985) (arguing that the mentally retarded are not “politically powerless”); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (stating that “old age does not define a ‘discrete and insular’
group”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (concluding that
residents of poorer school districts were not “relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”).
4. See infra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (finding that status as discrete and insular minority not prerequisite for application of strict scrutiny); Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 657 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“It would hardly take extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find ‘insular and discrete’
minorities at every turn in the road.”); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79
CAL. L. REV. 685 (1991).
6. For the purpose of this article, “rent seeking” is used in a broad sense to encompass
any situation in which one group seeks to obtain an economic benefit for itself at the expense
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discriminate often provide an economic benefit to a majority at the
expense of a minority. Subordination of a particular group can occur
if that group is persistently excluded from majority political or economic coalitions, thereby becoming the subject of rent seeking
rather than being able to gain benefits for itself.
Following the Carolene Products model, the democratic process
in a rent-seeking situation can be modeled as a cooperative game in
which players can form coalitions, and a coalition with the majority
of power can determine how to allocate a pot of money among the
players. Under an idealized view of the democratic process, the
“players” in a democracy (individuals or interest groups) can bargain
on an equal basis with other players. Over time, each group will end
up in a majority coalition a fair amount of time relative to its size and
political power. The model presented in this article shows that this
idealized picture may be less likely to occur in practice than it would
seem at first glance. When the game described above is played repeatedly, players have a competing long-term incentive to form a
stable winning coalition that votes every round to distribute the entire pot among its members and to maintain the coalition, even
against very attractive offers from other players. This strategy gains
rent for the majority at the expense of a stable minority. Other factors, like the cost of renegotiating an existing coalition, can make a
majority coalition even more stable.
Under this model, persistent discrimination based on a particular
trait can be viewed as a focal point strategy—an equilibrium strategy
that is particularly likely to be selected because of its shared salience.
Members of a democracy have a wide variety of majority coalitions to
choose from. Coalitions based on certain traits, however, may be
particularly likely to form and be stable, because they follow the lines
of existing social groups or because they provide a low-cost means to
seek rent. Such a trait may serve as a focal point for coalition formation in a repeated rent-seeking game. A focal point that persists over
time may eventually be internalized by society as a social norm to
which people thoughtlessly adhere.
A game-theoretic model has several advantages over existing
process-oriented and economic theories of discrimination, particularly as a guide to Equal Protection law. First, it describes why dis-

of another group. As discussed in Part III.A., below, rent seeking can be defined even more
broadly to encompass “psychic rents” like status.
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crimination against certain groups is likely to occur. When people
perceive themselves as competing with others for jobs, public goods,
or other benefits, they form coalitions with others in order to obtain
benefits for their group and, by extension, for themselves. Second, it
provides a potential explanation for the persistence of discrimination
over time. To the extent discrimination provides benefits to the
members of a majority group, that group has an incentive—albeit an
unvoiced one—to continue to discriminate. In particular, if a focal
point exists for the distribution of benefits, members of a group favored under the current structure may resist changing the focal
point. A focal point that has been internalized as a social norm may
be even more stable because people gain value from simple adherence to that norm. Finally, a game-theoretic model can explain why
discrimination is particularly likely to be based on certain traits,
rather than others. Under this model, a trait is likely to be used for
discrimination if it serves as a natural focal point for the formation of
a stable majority coalition in a rent-seeking game. A trait is likely to
serve as a focal point if it minimizes the costs associated with forming
and maintaining a stable coalition and the costs of rent seeking based
on that trait. For example, a trait that is visibly evident is more likely
to give rise to discrimination than a trait that is discoverable only at
some cost.
A game-theoretic model naturally addresses several controversial
issues in Equal Protection law. First, it provides guidance regarding
the types of traits that should be deemed suspect classifications and
thus give rise to heightened scrutiny. Because traits that act as focal
points for coalition formation are particularly likely to be used to discriminate, one inquiry in determining whether a classification should
be deemed suspect is whether it might be used to form stable rentseeking coalitions. Certain traits—for example, those that are immutable, are evident, and divide society into well-defined groups—seem
particularly likely to be used that way. Second, the model may help
explain why Equal Protection law serves a necessary function in a
democracy. The Equal Protection Clause can address situations in
which normal democratic process has broken down in that certain
groups persistently end up in the minority. These situations tend to
occur when a particular trait is being used to form a stable majority
coalition in order to seek benefits for that coalition at the expense of
a minority. Under this model, then, Equal Protection law can serve
at least two functions: in the short run, to identify situations in
56
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which this sort of stable rent seeking is occurring and prevent it; and
in the long run, to change social norms regarding discrimination by
preventing certain types of traits from being used as focal points for
rent seeking.
This article is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes the
democratic process using cooperative game theory and shows that a
group of players has some incentive to play a strategy that discriminates against another group of players. It discusses other reasons for
long-term stability of rent-seeking coalitions, including the function
of an existing equilibrium as a focal point, the use of punishment
strategies, and coalition-formation costs. It also analyzes historical
examples of the use of discrimination for rent-seeking purposes. The
second part of the article describes the implications of this approach
for Equal Protection doctrine, focusing on the definition of a discrete and insular minority and its application to suspect classifications.
II. A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF CAROLENE PRODUCTS
This section outlines a game-theoretic model of discrimination
along the lines of the coalitional bargaining scenario envisioned in
Carolene Products. The central idea of the model is that in certain
situations a democracy can be modeled as a rent-seeking game in
which players or groups can form coalitions with other players or
groups in order to seek benefits for themselves. In this type of game,
players have an incentive to form a majority coalition to seek rent at
the expense of a minority and, if possible, to maintain the coalition
against any counteroffer by the minority.
For the purposes of this section, I will analyze the democratic
process by means of a simple game—“divide-the-dollar”—that has
been used by political scientists and economists for many years.7 The
game assumes that a group of people is to divide up a fixed pot of
money among its members by majority vote. For simplicity, we will
assume that the game has three players—Players 1, 2, and 3—and
that the pot is one dollar. This game represents a pure rent-seeking
situation because any gain for one player must come at the expense
of another player. In other words, it is a zero-sum game.
7. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 147–50 (1962); PETER C.
ORDESHOOK, A POLITICAL THEORY PRIMER 288–91 (1992).
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While this particular example is very simple, it can be generalized
to situations involving any number of players and to situations in
which players have varying amounts of power. In applying this model
to real-world situations, the “players” may represent individuals or
groups. For example, a political situation might be represented as a
multiplayer game in which each player is a member of a legislative
body. A three-player game might capture a labor negotiation in
which the players are the employer, majority employees, and minority employees. In real-world situations, players may have varying
amounts of “votes,” which generally represent power to influence
the outcome of the game. Sources of power may include actual
numbers of votes, economic power, control over media, or ability to
retaliate against opponents. Thus, a group may lack a majority of
power in the sense of being able to influence political outcomes even
if it constitutes a numerical majority. Differing amounts of power can
be captured in a game-theoretic model by varying the number of the
players’ votes in the game.
This simple model has proved useful in addressing a variety of issues relating to the structure of a constitutional democracy. In their
groundbreaking work The Calculus of Consent, James Buchanan and
Gordon Tullock use modified versions of this model to analyze a variety of voting structures and to address issues like the effects of a
majority-voting rule and of a bicameral legislature.8 Coalitional game
theory has been used to analyze a variety of other constitutional issues, including privacy and equal protection.9 The following discussion details how the simple cooperative game described above can be
used to model discrimination.
A. Coalition Formation in a Simple Rent-Seeking Game
This section applies the three-person divide-the-dollar game to
the problem of discrimination in a democracy. Examining players’
incentives in this game can help explain why people might form
long-term, stable majority coalitions to seek rent at the expense of a
minority. This section first examines the coalitions that are likely to
form when the game is played once and then analyzes why these

8. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 209–62.
9. See Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into
Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787 (1992).
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coalitions are likely to be stable over time when the game is played
repeatedly.
The results are intuitively simple. When the game is played once,
standard game theory predicts that a minimum winning coalition will
form and vote to distribute the entire pot among its members. In the
three-player game, for example, Players 1 and 2 could form a coalition and agree to split the pot equally between them. When the
game is repeated, a minimum winning coalition formed in one round
might at first glance seem unstable, because the excluded players can
induce one of the coalition’s members to defect by offering her more
of the pot than she receives under the existing arrangement. However, a player can maximize her long-run payout by joining a stable
winning coalition and refusing any offer to defect, no matter how attractive the short-term benefit. Thus, we might expect players to play
a “discriminatory” strategy when the game is repeated, forming a
stable majority coalition that wins all of the pot at the expense of a
stable minority.
1. Coalitions when the game is played once
When Players 1, 2, and 3 play the divide-the-dollar game, we expect them to form a voting coalition10 of some sort to vote on an allocation of the dollar among them. If the game is played once, standard game theory and a number of psychological studies show that
two players are likely to form a minimum winning coalition, that is,
the smallest coalition with the power to approve an allocation of the
dollar (i.e., the smallest possible majority).11 In the three-player case,
two players are likely to form a coalition and vote to distribute all or
most of the dollar between themselves, leaving the third player with
little or nothing. For example, Players 1 and 2 could form a coalition
and vote for the allocation (1/2, 1/2, 0).12 A minimum winning
10. A coalition is a group of players that coordinate their actions so as to bring about an
outcome more beneficial to themselves than the outcome if the players do not coordinate.
ORDESHOOK, supra note 7, at 258.
11. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 148–52; see Steven G. Cole et al., Coalition Preference as a Function of Expected Values in a Tetradic Weighted-Majority Game, 16
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 109 (1995); J. Keith Murnighan et al., Theories of Coalition
Formation and the Effects of Reference Groups, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 166
(1977); Jonathan Segal, Coalition Formation in Tetrads: A Critical Test of Four Theories, 103 J.
PSYCHOL. 209 (1979).
12. An allocation of the dollar among the three players is represented by a vector (x1, x2,
x3), where xi represents the portion of the dollar allocated to player i. Thus, the allocation (½,
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coalition seems particularly likely because it gives its members a
higher average payout than a larger coalition. For example, assume
that the players are considering forming the grand coalition and dividing the dollar equally among themselves, yielding the payout
allocation (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Players 1 and 2 together jointly could
make themselves better off by forming the coalition {1, 2} and
dividing the dollar between themselves, giving Player 3 zero.
However, any two-player coalition appears to be, in a certain
sense, unstable. For example, suppose that Players 1 and 2 have proposed splitting the dollar equally between them, resulting in the
payout allocation (1/2, 1/2, 0). Player 3 can make a better offer to
either Player 1 or Player 2. For example, he could propose the allocation (2/3, 0, 1/3), and Player 1 would have an incentive to accept
it. In that case, however, Player 2 could disrupt a potential coalition
by making a further offer that is more attractive to Player 1 or Player
3. For example, he could propose (0, 1/2, 1/2) to Player 3. It is not
easy to see where this cycle will end, although some coalition must
ultimately carry the day if any player is to receive a payout.
Game theorists have developed several solution concepts that attempt to formalize our intuitions about the types of coalitions and
resulting payout allocations that are likely to occur. The most important for our purpose is the main-simple stable set. For the purpose of
the three-person divide-the-dollar game, the main-simple stable set is
the set of allocations under which a minimum winning coalition
splits the pot equally among its members—that is, the set V = {(1/2,
1/2, 0), (1/2, 0, 1/2), ( 0, 1/2, 1/2)}. Political theorists have
viewed this as the set of allocations most likely to result when the divide-the-dollar game is played once, and some have gone so far as to
call it the “solution” to the game.13 The reasoning behind this is
three-fold. First, a minimum winning coalition is particularly likely to
form because it maximizes the joint outcome of its members. Second, an allocation outside of V is unlikely to form because some majority coalition will always prefer an outcome in V. Finally, an allocation in V is likely to be stable because the coalition that supports it
½, 0) represents an outcome in which Players 1 and 2 split the dollar equally and Player 3 receives zero.
13. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 148–52; cf. ORDESHOOK, supra
note 7, at 290–98 (comparing other solution concepts). Empirical studies of related cooperative games show that players tend to form minimum winning coalitions more frequently than
larger coalitions. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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has no better alternative within V. The stable set is defined in more
detail in Appendix A.
2. Coalitions when the game is repeated
At first glance, a coalition formed when the divide-the-dollar
game is played once might seem to be unstable when the game is repeated. For example, suppose that in the first round of the game
Players 1 and 2 formed a coalition and voted for the allocation (1/2,
1/2, 0). When the game is played again, Player 3 can make a more
attractive offer to Player 1. For example, he can offer to vote for the
allocation (2/3, 0, 1/3). But then Player 2 can in turn make a better
offer to Player 3, for example (0, 1/3, 2/3). And so on. So our first
instinct might be that if the game is played more than once a different coalition will form each time it is played. Over time, each player
will be part of a winning coalition a “fair” amount of the time (the
amount depending on the player’s power and the size of the game).
However, players’ long-term interests may lead to coalitions being more stable than we would otherwise expect. For example, suppose that the first time the game is played, Players 1 and 2 form a
coalition and agree to divide the dollar (1/3, 1/3, 0). If the players
do not maintain this coalition and instead play an opportunistic
strategy by taking the best offer they can get each round, we would
expect that over time each player would get about one-third of the
dollar. Since all of the players are equal—each has one vote and no
bargaining leverage that other players lack—we would expect each
player to end up in a winning coalition an equal share of the time,
and thus end up with a more or less equal share of the pot. Suppose,
however, that Players 1 and 2 can come to some sort of tacit agreement that they will remain in their coalition and vote for the allocation (1/2, 1/2, 0) every round, ignoring any counteroffer, no matter how attractive, from Player 3. In the long run, Players 1 and 2
will each end up with half of the pot, which is more than the onethird that they could expect by playing an opportunistic strategy. In
essence, Players 1 and 2 are getting a higher payout for themselves
by discriminating against Player 3.
The players’ decision whether or not to maintain an existing coalition is similar to the decision in a prisoner’s dilemma.14 Assume that
14. The prisoner’s dilemma is a famous scenario in game theory used to illustrate situations in which people’s pursuit of their individual interests results in the worst possible joint
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Player 1 and Player 2 have proposed forming a coalition and dividing
the dollar equally between them, resulting in the allocation (1/2,
1/2, 0). Suppose further that this proposal acts as a focal point in
the sense that Player 1 and Player 2, when determining how to proceed, consider only whether to remain in the proposed coalition or
to negotiate secretly with Player 3 for a better deal. For the sake of
simplicity, we will assume that Player 3, who is excluded from the
proposed coalition, is willing to offer a deal to either Player 1 or
Player 2 in which Player 3 receives one-third and the other player receives two-thirds. If both Player 1 and Player 2 try to negotiate with
Player 3, Player 3 has an equal probability of forming a coalition with
either. If only one tries to negotiate, Player 3 has a 100% probability
of forming a coalition with that player.
The resulting two-player noncooperative game is as follows:

Player 2
Stay

Defect

Stay

(1/2, 1/2, 0)

(0, 2/3, 1/3)

Defect

(2/3, 0, 1/3)

(1/3, 1/3, 1/3)15

Player 1

outcome. The scenario involves a criminal prosecutor who is conducting independent interrogations of two criminal suspects. The prosecutor can prove that the prisoners committed a minor offense but requires a confession from one of them to prove that they committed a major
one. So he proposes the following deal: If neither prisoner confesses, each will be charged with
the minor offense and serve one year in prison. If one confesses and the other does not, the
confessor will be set free, but the other will be convicted of the major offense and serve the
maximum sentence of ten years. If both confess, each will be convicted of the major offense
but will serve a reduced penalty of eight years. Each prisoner, considering only his own selfinterest, has an incentive to confess, regardless of what his counterpart does. However, this
results in a worse outcome for both prisoners than if neither confesses. See ROGER B.
MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 97 (1991).
15. If both Players 1 and 2 attempt to negotiate secretly with Player 3, each has a fifty
percent chance of forming a coalition and receiving two-thirds and a fifty percent chance of
being excluded from the winning coalition and receiving zero. Therefore, each has an expected
payout of one-third.
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This game is a form of the prisoner’s dilemma. If unable to coordinate, Players 1 and 2 each have an incentive to defect and negotiate secretly with Player 3. If they can coordinate, they maximize
their joint expectation by remaining in the proposed coalition.
Therefore, we might expect that if the game is repeated, both a “cooperative” strategy (maintaining the existing coalition) and a “competitive” strategy (defecting in light of a better offer) will be equilibria of the repeated game.16 Since the cooperative strategy maximizes
the payouts of Players 1 and 2, we can expect that they will have
some incentive to play this strategy, particularly if they can coordinate.
This result can be described more formally by imposing a bargaining structure on the repeated divide-the-dollar game—a cooperative game—and transforming it into a repeated noncooperative
game. The players can then be treated as independent of each other,
forming coalitions through a negotiation process in which each
player acts in his or her own self-interest. We can “solve” the repeated divide-the-dollar game under the hypothetical bargaining
structure. The main result for the purpose of this article is that, assuming the players do not discount future payouts too much and
there are not too many players, a “discriminatory” strategy in which
players attempt to form and maintain a stable minimum winning
coalition is an equilibrium strategy of the repeated divide-the-dollar
game. A more detailed description and proof of this result are provided in Appendix B.
Coalition-formation costs may act to make an equilibrium strategy even more stable. For example, suppose that in the three-person,
divide-the-dollar game Players 1 and 2 are currently in a coalition
together, and each has the option of negotiating a coalition with
Player 3. If negotiation with Player 3 imposes costs on the players—
which would reduce the value of the new coalition—Players 1 and 2
will have an additional incentive (beyond the strategic interests discussed above) to remain in the existing coalition. In fact, negotiation
16. When the prisoner’s dilemma is played once, we expect self-interested players to play
a competitive strategy because they gain by doing so, regardless of the action of their opponent. When the game is played repeatedly, however, cooperative strategies become feasible
because a player’s defection in one round may induce his opponent to defect in subsequent
rounds. See ORDESHOOK, supra note 7, at 173–80. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
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with Player 3 might lead to offers and counteroffers among all of the
various players, leading to an extended negotiation that would consume much of the value of whatever coalition ends up forming. This
“downward spiral” once negotiations are opened up may act as a
strong incentive to play a stable strategy, rather than an opportunistic strategy.17
3. Discrimination as a focal point in a repeated game
The above discussion indicates that creating some stable majority
coalition is likely to be an equilibrium strategy in the repeated divide-the-dollar game. However, the players have a choice of many
other equilibria as well. First, they have a wide variety of majority
coalitions from which to choose. Second, they may choose not to
form a stable coalition at all, instead playing something akin to an
“opportunistic” strategy, renegotiating coalitions as necessary to
maximize their short-term payout. Determining which of the above
strategy profiles are equilibria does not necessarily tell us which equilibrium is likely to form.
When a game has more than one equilibrium strategy, certain
equilibria may be more likely to occur in practice than others. A famous example is the coordination game in which two players know
they must meet each other in New York City on a specific day but
are otherwise unable to communicate. Each must pick a time and
place and hope that the other player shows up. This game has an infinite number of equilibria, in which both players show up at the
same time and same location in New York City. Nonetheless, when
people were asked about their choice of strategy (the time and place
at which they would try to meet), over half selected Grand Central
Station as the place, and nearly all selected noon as the time.18 Participants picked this place and time not simply because it appeared
salient to them, but more importantly, because they expected it to be
salient to the person they were supposed to meet. An equilibrium
that players are particularly likely to adopt because of its mutual salience is called a focal point.19

17. See Roger D. Congleton & Robert D. Tollison, The Stability Inducing Propensities of
Very Unstable Coalitions: Avoiding the Downward Spiral of Majoritarian Rent-Seeking, 15
EUR. J. POL. ECON. 193 (1999).
18. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–56 (1960).
19. Id. at 54–57.
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Like the meeting-in-New-York game, the repeated divide-thedollar game has multiple equilibria. In the three-player game, the
players have an incentive to form a two-person majority coalition.
However, if all players are identical and no coalition existed beforehand, we have no apparent way to predict what coalition will form.
Suppose, however, that the players have already played one round,
and in the first round Player 1 and Player 2 formed a coalition. This
coalition, because it has already formed once, is likely to be more salient than the other two possible coalitions, and, thus, we might expect Player 1 and Player 2 to form the same coalition again.20
Similarly, suppose that no coalition existed before this round of
the game, but assume instead that Players 1 and 2 share some characteristic that distinguishes them from Player 3. For example, suppose Players 1 and 2 speak English and Player 3 speaks French. This
shared trait might provide a way of distinguishing the coalition {1, 2}
from the coalitions {1, 3} and {2, 3}, and thus make the coalition between Players 1 and 2 particularly likely to form. As before, the coalition {1, 2} is likely to be a focal point in the coalition-formation
game.
A coalition formed around a trait may become salient because it
is particularly easy to form and maintain over time. For example, coalitions formed around a trait that divides people into two separate
groups with little gray area in between them might be particularly
easy to maintain because of the lack of a need to bargain over where
to draw the line between the majority and the minority. Also, coalition-formation costs may increase with a coalition’s size. Public
choice theorists have long recognized that a small, well-organized
group finds it much easier to create and maintain a stable coalition
than a large, diffuse group.21 Players’ demonstrated preference for a
minimum winning coalition, rather than a larger coalition, may be
due in part to the higher costs incurred in obtaining the agreement
of additional players, as well as the cost of policing the coalition to
prevent defection.22
A particular shared trait may act as a focal point in a game even
20. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1649, 1702 (2000) (explaining that in a repeated game, an equilibrium played in one round
may act as a focal point for subsequent rounds).
21. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724–26
(1985).
22. Id.
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though it is entirely arbitrary and bears no relationship to any meaningful characteristics of the players. For example, studies have been
performed in which students are placed into one of two categories
ostensibly based on preference for certain artistic styles. When these
students were asked to allocate payouts to members of their own
“group”—those with the same artistic preferences—and members of
the other group, they consistently allocated more to members of
their own group.23 This result occurred even when students were
visibly divided into groups based on no more than the flip of a
coin.24 Arbitrary division into groups can affect coalition formation
in bargaining games, as players have been found to prefer coalitions
with members of their own group.25
All of this suggests that a coalition based around a shared trait
may become a focal point strategy for one of two reasons. First, that
coalition may simply be a coalition that already exists or that has
been used in the past for rent-seeking purposes. Second, the coalition may provide a low-cost or salient way of distinguishing some
players from other players. The import of this observation for Equal
Protection doctrine will be discussed in more detail below, but it is
worth noting that it may describe why a trait like race or gender may
operate as a focal point for coalition formation in a rent-seeking
game. First, these traits provide a natural and low-cost way to distinguish the players in the majority from the players in the minority because they are obvious and because—at least as they have been societally constructed—they divide society more or less into separate
groups. Second, the history of discrimination based on these traits
indicates that they have been used in the past for coalition building.
Preexisting coalitions based on these traits may function as focal
points simply because they already exist.
While the game-theoretic model applies principally to discrimination at the group level (discrimination in the political process), analyzing discrimination based on race and gender as a focal point in a
coalitional game may also help explain why discrimination occurs in
other contexts. When a game is played repeatedly, a focal point strategy that is adopted by the players may, over time, become internal23. HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES 268–72 (1981).
24. Id.
25. James Martinez, The Effect of Social Categorization on Coalition Formation (1985)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with the Stanford Law
School Library).
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ized by the players as a social norm.26 Once a social norm has been
adopted, players receive utility in the form of reputational benefits by
complying with the norm. That is, they comply with the norm in order to receive esteem from other members of their social group.
Thus, for example, once a social norm has been established that favors racial discrimination, people might comply with this norm, even
when it does not directly provide them with a strategic advantage in
a game, but simply because other members of their social group expect them to comply with it. The benefit that people gain from this
type of discrimination may take the form of increased intragroup
status27 or a reputation for being faithful to the existing coalitional
structure and willing to cooperate with other members of the majority.28
B. Discrimination by Individuals
While the above model is intended to explain discrimination by
groups against other groups, it may yield some insights into why individuals discriminate against other individuals. Many rent-seeking
situations within society are likely to involve small groups of individuals, rather than the entire population. For example, a societywide social norm favoring discrimination along racial lines might be
used in a situation involving a single industry or a single employer.
That is, individuals within a larger coalition can be responsible for
individual acts of discrimination.29 Individuals within a larger majority coalition have an incentive to discriminate along established lines.
This can be illustrated using a simple example. We assume that
rent-seeking situations in our society occur in situations involving
small subsets of the society as a whole. For simplicity, we will assume
that each situation involves exactly three players, selected randomly.30
26. Much recent literature has analyzed social norms as focal points in coordination
games, although most involves noncooperative games (like the prisoner’s dilemma) rather than
cooperative games. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Cristina Bicchieri, Norms of Cooperation, 100 ETHICS 838 (1990); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and
Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); McAdams, supra note 20.
27. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1023–29 (1995).
28. See E. POSNER, supra note 26, at 133–47.
29. David H. Swinton, A Labor Force Competition Model of Racial Discrimination in the
Labor Market, 9 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 5, 21 (1978), reprinted in 1 ECONOMICS AND
DISCRIMINATION 334 (W. Farity, Jr. ed., 1995).
30. This is akin to George Akerlof’s model of discrimination in random encounters be-
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Rent-seeking situations might involve, for example, competition for
a scarce job or access to a public good, like education. Assume that
our society is divided into two groups: a majority, denoted with a ,
and a minority, denoted with a , four groups of three are possible:
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
Now suppose that the members of the majority have two possible strategies. They can play opportunistically, trying to get the best
deal for themselves regardless of the makeup of the participants of
the game, or they can play a coordinated strategy in which they agree
to form a coalition among their own members whenever possible. If
they play opportunistically, they will end up with around one-third
of the total rent on the average, since their strategy treats all players
equally. If all players use a discriminatory strategy, the payouts in the
three situations including at least one member of the majority will be
something like the following:
(
) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
(
) = (1/2, 1/2, 0 )
(
) = (0, 1/2, 1/2)
If we assume that the society contains m members of the majority and n members of the minority, the odds that an individual player
will be in a group with another member of the majority and one
member of the minority (
) will be proportional to mn. The
odds that he will be in a group with two members of the minority
(
) is proportional to n2/2. It is simple to calculate that, as long
as the members of the majority constitute a majority (i.e., m > n),
they are better off, as a whole, playing a discrimination strategy
rather than an opportunistic strategy.
Within an individual game, however, a member of the majority
may have an incentive to defect from the coordinated strategy in order to maximize his own payout. Suppose that a member of the majority (call him i) in a group with one member of the minority
(
) would be able to secure a better deal by bargaining with the
member of the minority. For example, assume that i could secure the
payout allocation (2/3, 0, 1/3). The majority can dissuade this type

zzz
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tween agents. George A. Akerlof, Discriminatory, Status-based Wages Among TraditionOriented, Stochastically Trading Coconut Producers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 265 (1985).
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of defection using a simple punishment strategy. If i defects, the next
time he is in a group consisting of three members of the majority
(
), the other two majority members will cut him out, treating
him as though he were a member of the minority, and he will get a
payout of zero rather than one-third. In this case, i gains one-sixth
when he is in a group with one other member of the majority and
loses one-third when he is in a group with two other members of the
majority. Since the odds of i being in group (
) are propor) are proportional to m2/2, and the odds of being in group (
tional to mn, the ostracism strategy will dissuade defection in this example as long as m > n. These types of punishment strategies have
been used in real-world examples as detailed in Part II.D, below.

zzz

zzz
zz{

C. Testing the Model: Stability of Coalitions in Empirical Studies
In contrast to the vast literature on both repeated noncooperative games31 and single-play cooperative games,32 very little empirical
work has studied the stability of coalitions in repeated cooperative
games. The few studies that exist, however, demonstrate that players
in these games have a long-term incentive to form and maintain stable coalitions, although a competing incentive exists to maximize
short-term gains.
A short series of studies in the 1960s and 1970s attempted to
measure the stability of coalitions over time in a three-person bargaining game.33 In the first study, each of the three potential minimum winning coalitions—{1, 2}, {1, 3}, and {2, 3}—was assigned a
payout. The grand coalition {1, 2, 3} was not assigned a payout and
was, presumably, prohibited. Eight groups of three played this game
forty times in succession. Of the eight groups, five appear to have
played something akin to a stable strategy, with the winning coali31. The seminal work in this area is AXELROD, supra note 16. For a sampling of the
hundreds of articles analyzing and applying the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, see Robert Axelrod & Lisa D’Ambrosio, Annotated Bibliography on the Evolution of Cooperation (1994),
available at http://www.pscs.umich.edu/RESEARCH/Evol_of_Coop_Bibliography.html.
32. See, e.g., Cole et al., supra note 11; H. Andrew Michener & Daniel J. Myers, An
Empirical Comparison of Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories in 3-person Sidepayment
Games, 45 THEORY & DECISION 37 (1998); Segal, supra note 11.
33. See Bernhardt Lieberman, Coalitions and Conflict Resolution, 18 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 557 (1975) [hereinafter Lieberman II]; Bernhardt Lieberman, i-Trust: A Notion of
Trust in Three-person Games and International Affairs, 8 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 271 (1964)
[hereinafter Lieberman I]. The payouts for the three potential coalitions differed, making this
game slightly different from the divide-the-dollar game discussed in this article.
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tion changing fewer than ten times. In three of these groups, the
winning coalition changed only twice.34 The remaining three groups
appear to have played a form of opportunistic strategy, with the winning coalition changing at least twenty times.35 In a subsequent
study, a total of twenty-five groups of three played a similar game,
but in addition to receiving a payment each round, the members of a
coalition that remained stable through all forty trials received a bonus payment. With this modification, a majority of groups unsurprisingly formed a stable winning coalition that lasted through all forty
trials.36 Of the remaining groups, three appear to have had only one
change in the winning coalition.37
A separate study by Keith Murnighan explored the reasons for
defection from a stable coalition in a repeated five-person bargaining
game.38 In this experiment, forty groups of five played a total of 155
games, each consisting of twelve trials. In almost one-quarter of the
games, a single winning coalition remained stable through all twelve
trials. In the remaining games, a total of 131 stable coalitions—
winning coalitions lasting three or more rounds—formed.39 When a
defection occurred, post-defection and long-run payouts were less
than pre-defection payouts for all members of the stable coalition,
including both defectors and nondefectors.40 In this sense, as
Murnighan notes, the game was similar to a repeated prisoner’s dilemma.41
Anecdotes from these studies demonstrate that players recognized the long-term value of a stable coalition. In the Murnighan
study, students described their expectation that other coalition
34. Lieberman I, supra note 33, at 276.
35. Id.
36. Lieberman II, supra note 33, at 573.
37. Id. Two important aspects of these studies may have affected the stability of coalitions over time. First, all of the studies repeated a game a finite number of times. During the
last few rounds of the game, end-game factors may have given the players an incentive to defect from an existing coalition because the long-term advantage of remaining in a stable coalition would have disappeared. Second, like the model in this paper, Lieberman’s studies involved only three players; thus, the costs of renegotiating a coalition were likely to be low.
38. J. Keith Murnighan, Defectors, Vulnerability, and Relative Power: Some Causes and
Effects of Leaving a Stable Coalition, 34 HUM. REL. 589 (1981). The players in Murnighan’s
study had varying numbers of votes (they were not equally powerful) because his study was
intended to measure the effect of power differences on willingness to defect.
39. Id. at 601.
40. Id. at 606.
41. Id. at 607.
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members would continue to be loyal, which increased their own loyalty to an existing coalition.42 In the Lieberman study, players
evinced trust of their current coalition partners and recognized the
potential long-term effects of defection: “I must trust [Player] 1 and
he can trust me. If I leave him, you’ll wonder if I might leave you.
Then if you two team up, I’ll have nowhere to turn.”43 This indicates
that players were thinking along the lines described in the discussion
of the three-person divide-the-dollar game, above.
D. Testing the Model: Discrimination for
the Purpose of Rent Seeking
The history of race and gender discrimination in both the United
States and other countries provides many examples of discrimination
for the purpose of rent seeking. These situations can be modeled as a
cooperative game with coalitions being formed on the basis of race
or gender.44 This section describes three historical examples of discrimination for rent-seeking purposes: (1) racial discrimination in the
Jim Crow South; (2) racial discrimination in the labor market; and
(3) discrimination against women in the labor market.
1. Rent seeking in the Jim Crow South
The Jim Crow South provides numerous examples of rent seeking on the basis of race. Laws and practices that acted to benefit the
white majority at the expense of the black minority fall broadly into
two groups. First, a system of labor laws acted to reduce the wages of
agricultural laborers. Second, segregation laws enabled whites to obtain more and better public goods than blacks.45
42. Id. at 608.
43. Lieberman I, supra note 33, at 278.
44. Jennifer Roback, Racism as Rent Seeking, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 661, 671–72, 675–79
(1989) [hereinafter Roback II].
45. Segregation laws have been analyzed under an associational preference theory.
However, analyzing them as rent seeking eliminates the need to assume an exogenous “taste”
for discrimination because it recognizes that a majority may derive direct economic benefit
from discriminatory laws. As W.H. Hutt noted with respect to South African apartheid,
We do not, however, find in colour prejudice as such the main origin—nor,
perhaps, even the most important cause—of most economic colour bars. The chief
source of colour discrimination is, I suggest, to be found in the natural determination to defend economic privilege (the preservation of “customary economic relationships between the races”), non-Whites simply happening to be the essentially
underprivileged groups in South Africa.
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The first group of laws acted to depress the wages of black agricultural workers by creating what was essentially a cartel of white
employers. These laws included enticement and contractenforcement laws, which made it difficult for laborers to switch employers; vagrancy laws; emigrant-agent laws; and the convict-lease
system.46 Enticement laws made it illegal for an employer to “entice”
a worker who had a contract with a different employer.47 Contractenforcement laws criminalized a laborer’s breach of an employment
contract. Emigrant-agent laws made it illegal to entice workers to
leave a city or state and take employment elsewhere.48 All of these
laws were intended to reduce competition for farm labor, thereby reducing wages.49 Vagrancy laws, which outlawed behavior like “‘wandering or strolling about in idleness,’”50 effectively made it a crime to
be out of work.
The punishment for crimes like vagrancy and contract-breach itself served as a form of rent seeking. Convicted vagrants were typically put on chain gangs and forced to work on local public-works
projects.51 Many Southern states employed a convict-lease system
under which convicts could be leased by the state or county to private firms.52 This served not only as a means for the state and private
planters to obtain low-cost labor, but also created a strong enforcement mechanism for laws that effectively forced laborers to work for
submarket wages.
In addition to laws giving whites an advantage in the labor market, a separate set of laws gave whites increased access to local public
goods, like hospitals, libraries, parks, and schools. Beginning with
statutes requiring separate train compartments for blacks and whites,
Southern states and cities enacted a network of ordinances and regulations that segregated virtually every form of public facility.53 While
W.H. HUTT, THE ECONOMICS OF THE COLOUR BAR 27 (1964).
46. Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163–64 (1984) [hereinafter Roback I].
47. Id. at 1164.
48. Id. at 1169.
49. Id. at 1164.
50. Id. at 1168 (quoting 1903 Ala. Acts 224).
51. Id. at 1168–69.
52. Id. at 1170.
53. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 97–100 (2d rev. ed.
1966); see GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY 334–36 (1944).
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the laws facially specified “separate but equal” facilities, in reality the
practice was much different. Many recreational facilities, built and
maintained with public funds, were closed entirely to blacks.54 Only a
fraction of public libraries in the South served blacks.55 Even when
separate facilities existed for blacks, they were of much lower quality
than those available to whites. Streets in primarily black areas of cities
were not maintained as well as those in white areas.56 The best government jobs went mostly to whites.57
Discrimination in the provision of public goods was particularly
obvious in the case of education. Schools were segregated through
the South. Per-pupil spending for black students was often a fraction
of that for white students.58 Teachers’ salaries in black schools were
lower than those in white schools, and the student-teacher ratio was
higher.59 Facilities at black schools were of poorer quality than those
in white schools. Thus, education served as a form of direct rent
seeking by reserving to whites the vast majority of public funds used
for that purpose.60
Discrimination in public education also acted as an indirect form
of rent seeking by providing whites with a greater opportunity than
blacks to develop the human capital required for the best jobs.61 Seg-

54. MYRDAL, supra note 53, at 346–47.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 335. A number of cities were at one time separated by law into all-white and
all-black blocks. Restrictive covenants performed a similar function. WOODWARD, supra note
53, at 100–01.
57. MYRDAL, supra note 53, at 335.
58. For example, in Mississippi and Georgia, spending per white pupil was five times
greater than spending per black pupil. Id. at 339.
59. Id.
60. Myrdal notes that spending differentials between black and white students were
greatest in counties with large black populations, hypothesizing that those counties had a
greater incentive to seek rent through public education:
State appropriations for educational purposes are usually apportioned on a per capita
basis. Counties with a high proportion of Negro children, consequently, have a bigger opportunity than have other counties to deprive Negro schools of money intended for them and to use it for white schools. For, in such counties there is more
money to “rob” from the Negroes, and the temptation to do it, therefore, must be
particularly great.
Id. at 341 (footnote omitted). See also Roback II, supra note 44, at 678 (“[C]ounties with
relatively large black populations[] distributed the money allocated for black children to the
white schools. . . . Thus, white schools in black belt counties were the best funded schools in
the South.”).
61. Roback II, supra note 44, at 667–68.
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regation of other types of facilities may also have served an indirect
rent-seeking function by reducing contact between racial groups,
thus denying blacks networking opportunities available to whites.62
The Jim Crow system was supported by a “punishment strategy”
that discouraged defection by individual members of the majority.
This strategy was similar to the ostracism strategy described above, in
which a defecting member of the majority is treated as a member of
the minority. Social custom permitted whites to disregard rules of
segregation by, for example, using facilities designated for blacks.63
However, whites who routinely disregarded discriminatory customs
effectively “los[t] caste” and were subject to sanctions, including
threats, intimidation, and open violence, normally reserved to members of the minority.64
2. Rent seeking in the labor market based on race
In addition to the openly discriminatory laws in the Jim Crow
South, a separate set of policies operated in the early 1900s to protect skilled, high-paying, or high-status jobs for white workers. At
about the same time that the Jim Crow system arose in the South, a
policy of Jim Crow unionism arose, and many labor unions began to
organize themselves openly around race. In 1900, the American
Federation of Labor (AFL), which up to that point had been officially race-neutral, amended its constitution to allow charters to be
issued to racially segregated unions.65 A number of AFL affiliates had
official policies barring blacks from membership, while others used
practices that had the same effect, like stringent skill requirements,
high initiation fees, or refusal to honor travel cards of black work-

62. For example, as the Supreme Court has noted with respect to segregation in law
schools:
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts. . . . The law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes from
its student body members of the racial groups which number 85% of the population
of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of
the Texas Bar.
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
63. MYRDAL, supra note 53, at 575–76.
64. Id. at 576.
65. PHILIP S. FONER, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE BLACK WORKER 1619–1981, at
72–73 (Int’l Publishers 2d ed. 1981) (1974).
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ers.66 Employers followed suit, excluding black workers from industries, particularly skilled industries, in which an adequate supply of
white labor existed.67 As a result, black workers were excluded from
many of the most desirable jobs.68
Race relations during this period show an element of coalitional
bargaining. After Reconstruction, rural whites perceived blacks as
competition for increasingly scarce positions as tenants and sharecroppers.69 The Southern aristocracy encouraged racial tensions in
order to prevent political cooperation between poor blacks and poor
whites. In fact, prior to 1890, the black vote in the South generally
aligned with the white aristocracy.70 As the nation industrialized,
white-dominated labor unions played a role in protecting desirable
jobs for white workers. In order to prevent a labor coalition between
white and black workers, employers themselves discriminated in hiring, favoring white workers where they were available. The joint
support of white workers and white employers for discriminatory
norms can be seen as a coalition between those groups to seek rent
in the labor market at the expense of black workers.
Race relations in the labor market have explicitly been modeled
as a three-player game among employers, majority workers, and minority workers.71 Each player has some bargaining leverage: The employer has control over hiring and wages and can give a preference to
a certain subset of the labor force in hiring for the best jobs. Each set
of workers can engage in cost-raising tactics, like a strike, slowdown,
boycott, etc.72 If the two groups of workers cooperate with one another, they gain bargaining power because their cost-raising tactics

66. Id. at 73–74.
67. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND
CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 67 (2d ed. 1980); see also MYRDAL, supra note 53, at
294.
68. See MYRDAL, supra note 53, at 280–96; WILSON, supra note 67, at 73–74.
69. WILSON, supra note 67, at 54.
70. Id. at 55.
71. See Swinton, supra note 29; see also DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, GENDER &
RACIAL INEQUALITY AT WORK: THE SOURCES & CONSEQUENCES OF JOB SEGREGATION 62
(1993) (“[E]mployers can be understood to be forming coalitions with white male workers to
exclude women and minorities from desirable jobs.”); Ray Marshall, The Economics of Racial
Discrimination: A Survey, 12 J. ECON. LITERATURE 849 (1974) (analyzing racial discrimination in employment using a bargaining model with actors including employers, white workers,
black workers, unions, and the government).
72. Swinton, supra note 29, at 26–27.
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will be more effective.73 Under this model the employer might
choose to form a tacit coalition with majority workers, agreeing to
restrict high-status, high-paying jobs to members of the majority in
exchange for lower average wages, in order to prevent a labor coalition between black and white workers.74 The employer chooses the
majority workers as a bargaining partner because their cost-raising
tactics are more effective than those of the minority. 75
3. Rent seeking based on gender
Discrimination on the grounds of both race and gender has been
analyzed using this type of model. In the 1800s and early 1900s,
many male-dominated unions tried to protect male workers in skilled
jobs from competition from females. Protection took the form of
hour restrictions, prohibitions on working out of the home, and
prohibition of women from certain types of jobs.76 For example, laws
in the United States at various times prohibited women from practicing law77 or tending bar.78 Unions frequently excluded women, either barring them from membership entirely or restricting the positions that they could hold.79
Heidi Hartmann cites the cigar-making industry as a prominent
example.80 In 1860, over 90% of workers in the cigar industry were
male. In 1869, a wooden cigar mold was introduced, and women
began to be employed in their homes, making cigars using the

73. Id.; see also MATS LUNDAHL & ESKIL WADENSJÖ, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: A
STUDY IN THE NEO-CLASSICAL THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION 50 (1984) (explaining neoMarxist theory).
74. Swinton, supra note 29, at 29.
75. The labor market can also be viewed as a cooperative game among employees only,
treating the employer as exogenous to the game. Some Marxist theorists have argued that a
nonhomogeneous labor force offers a natural focal point for low-cost coalition formation
within the labor force. In this case, self-interested workers can maximize their individual outcomes by forming the smallest possible coalition that can construct an effective threat to the
employer. Bruce Talbot Coram, Spoiling the Class Divide: Struggles Within the Working Class
over Distribution, 43 BRIT. J. SOC. 393 (1992).
76. See generally SYLVIA WALBY, PATRIARCHY AT WORK: PATRIARCHAL AND
CAPITALIST RELATIONS IN EMPLOYMENT 90–155 (1986); Heidi Hartmann, Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex, in WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 137, 147–69 (Martha
Blaxall & Barbara Reagan eds., 1976).
77. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
78. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
79. Hartmann, supra note 76, at 164.
80. Id. at 162.
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molds. In response, the Cigarmakers International Union, which was
male-dominated, successfully sought laws banning home work and
also argued for a restriction on the number of hours women could
work.81
Courts initially upheld laws discriminating against women on the
ground that women needed to be protected. In the early case Bradwell v. State, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting women
from practicing law.82 In Muller v. Oregon, for example, the Supreme
Court upheld maximum hours laws for women, saying:
The two sexes differ in structure of body, . . . in the capacity for
long-continued labor, particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the
self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence. This difference justifies a difference in legislation and upholds that which is designed to
compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her. 83

The openly given rationale for these laws was the protection of
male jobs. Proponents of these laws argued that men, as breadwinners for the home, required a higher wage than women, whose income was normally supplemental to that of men.84
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUAL PROTECTION
To summarize the discussion up to this point, a simple gametheoretic model shows that people may have an incentive to discriminate in order to seek rent for themselves at the expense of a
long-term minority. People or groups are likely to form long-term
rent-seeking coalitions along the lines of traits that allow stable coalitions to be formed and maintained, and used to seek rent, at low
cost. Once formed, a coalition structure acts as a focal point in future

81. Id.
82. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130. The concurrence by Justice Bradley opined:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in
the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be,
woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of
civil life.
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
83. 208 U.S. 412, 422–23 (1908).
84. See WALBY, supra note 76, at 148–50; Hartmann, supra note 76, at 158–59.
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rent-seeking situations and can become internalized as a social norm
favoring discrimination.
This model provides a means for analyzing Equal Protection
doctrine using the political process approach of Carolene Products.
This section begins with an overview of related theories of Equal
Protection, including process-oriented theories and economic theories of discrimination. It then describes the implications of the gametheoretic model for Equal Protection doctrine, focusing particularly
on the definition of a suspect classification and on the role of Equal
Protection law in remedying discrimination.
A. Existing Theories of Equal Protection and Discrimination
Theories of Equal Protection fall broadly into two categories:
antidifferentiation theories, which focus on the rights of individuals,
and antisubordination or political-process theories, which focus on
the status of groups and the process by which certain groups become
subordinated.85 The Carolene Products approach ties naturally to an
antisubordination theory because it focuses on a group’s lack of
power in the political process.
While the model in this article posits an economic explanation
for discrimination—or at least one that uses economic analytical
tools—it differs from most existing economic explanations for discrimination. Most economic theories of discrimination do not tie
naturally to Equal Protection law because they do not explain why
certain types of traits (like immutable traits) are particularly likely to
be the basis of discrimination or why a particular group can be
persistently disadvantaged in the political process. This section gives
an overview of existing process-oriented theories of Equal Protection
and economic theories of discrimination and then describes the advantages of a game-theoretic approach.
1. Process theories of Equal Protection
Process-oriented theories, following the Carolene Products approach, have described Equal Protection doctrine as remedying defects in the political process that can result in the subordination of a
minority. John Hart Ely, in Democracy and Distrust, accepts that the

85. Ruth Colker, Anti-subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1986).
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democratic system “does not ensure . . . the effective protection of
minorities whose interests differ from the interests of most of the rest
of us.”86 If representatives rely on the support of a majority coalition
to be reelected, they have an incentive to pass laws favoring the majority coalition and ignoring the minority that they do not need.
This creates a representation-enforcing role for the judiciary. Under
Ely’s theory, the judiciary may review laws that classify people based
on race and “racelike” characteristics in a way that might be motivated by stereotypes.87 In particular, when most representatives possess a particular trait, there is a danger that they will engage in “wethey” generalization, “seizing upon the positive myths about [their]
own class and the negative myths about” the other, and assuming
“that not many of ‘them’ will be unfairly deprived, nor many of ‘us’
unfairly benefitted, by the proposed classification.”88
Ely has difficulty, however, determining which traits should give
rise to suspect scrutiny. While maintaining that suspect classifications
must be “racelike,” he concedes that existing theory does not define
this concept.89 Ely runs through a number of alternatives. Considering immutability, he notes that the list of truly immutable traits is
very small, and that even those do not all give rise to suspect scrutiny
under current doctrine (intelligence and physical disability, for example, do not).90 Similarly, while the Supreme Court has suggested
that distinctions perceived as “a stigma of inferiority and a badge of
opprobrium”91 should be deemed suspect, it has not described the
level of stigma necessary for a class to be suspect or why certain
classes that historically have been stigmatized—like homosexuals and
the disabled—have not been protected. Ultimately Ely falls back on
the notion of “we-they” stereotyping, the idea that distinctions are
likely to be for an improper purpose when they work to the benefit
of those in power.92
More recently, Bruce Ackerman has attacked the use of “discrete

86. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 78
(1980).
87. Id. at 158.
88. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 933–34 n.85 (1973).
89. ELY, supra note 86, at 149.
90. Id. at 150.
91. Jimenez v. Weinbeger, 417 U.S. 628, 631 (1974).
92. ELY, supra note 86, at 158–59.
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and insular minority” as the touchstone for a higher level of scrutiny.93 According to standard public choice theory, he argues, small,
identifiable groups can organize themselves easily and, therefore,
have more political power relative to their size than a large, diffuse
group does. As an example, particular industries are frequently able
to enact protective tariffs that are beneficial to their groups but
harmful to society at large.94 Accordingly, he concludes, discreteness
and insularity are red herrings. A group’s protected status should derive not from the fact that the group is small and easy to identify, but
rather from the existence of prejudice against that group.95
2. Economic theories of discrimination
Most existing economic models of discrimination do not tie
naturally to an antisubordination approach to Equal Protection. The
two prevailing neoclassical theories, the associational preferences, or
“taste” theory,96 and models based on statistical discrimination,97 focus on discrimination by individuals, rather than discrimination at
the group level. Moreover, these theories, particularly those that assume a preexisting taste to avoid association with certain groups, fo93. Ackerman, supra note 21, at 713.
94. Id. at 728.
95. Id. at 731.
96. The associational preferences theory, first proposed by Gary Becker, hypothesizes a
“taste” for discrimination that is present in varying amounts in different people. A person with
a taste for discrimination against a certain group will pay, or forfeit income, in order to avoid
contact with the disfavored group. The taste for discrimination imposes a cost on transactions
between members of different groups, which is treated in the same way as other types of costs.
For example, suppose that an employer has a taste for discrimination against a certain group,
and, therefore, when hiring a member of that group acts as though it incurs a cost beyond that
person’s wages. That additional cost, which Becker refers to as a “discrimination coefficient,” is
a measure of the degree of the employer’s aversion to association with the disfavored group.
See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 651–53 (4th ed. 1992).
97. A model based on statistical discrimination proposes that membership in a racial or
other group is used as a surrogate for the possession of undesirable qualities that members of
that group are believed to have. For example, a firm with incomplete information about workers’ productivity might use race, gender, or some other trait as a surrogate for likely productivity when hiring workers. If the firm believes that members of a particular race are less productive, and the cost of determining a worker’s productivity ex-post is sufficiently high, the firm
may discriminate against members of that race based on its belief. In the case of so-called racial
profiling, police who believe that members of a certain race are likely to commit crimes may
discriminate against members of that race. See, e.g., LUNDAHL & WADENSJÖ, supra note 73, at
41–46; Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR
MARKETS 3 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973).
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cus on the effects, rather than the causes, of discrimination. Most
importantly, they do not explain why discrimination is particularly
likely to be based on certain types of traits, like race and gender, and
therefore provide little guidance in the area of suspect classification
doctrine.
More recently, Richard McAdams has proposed an economic
model based on status-seeking, arguing that discrimination is a
method of increasing a group’s status relative to another group.98
McAdams notes that individuals have a taste for status derived both
from membership within a certain group (intergroup status) and
from the esteem in which they are held by other members of that
group (intragroup status).99 Discrimination arises when one social
group attempts to increase its own status by portraying members of
an out-group as inferior. Discriminatory social norms, under this
theory, prevent members of the high-status group from free riding
on each other’s investment in the status of their group. Individuals
who comply with discriminatory norms are held in higher esteem by
other members of the in-group, thereby increasing their intragroup,
as well as intergroup, status.100
McAdams’s theory is more useful for policymakers than models
based on associational preferences or statistical discrimination because it describes both why discrimination arises and why it persists.
In fact, as will be described in more detail, a status-seeking theory is
structurally similar to the rent-seeking model described in this article.101 However, it fails to answer two questions addressed by the
rent-seeking model. First, by ignoring the use of discrimination for
rent-seeking purposes, it does not describe how one group becomes
“high-status” and the other becomes “low-status.” In fact, people
derive status from membership within a group in a very wide variety
of circumstances—for example, groups based in national heritage,
98. McAdams, supra note 27.
99. Id. at 1019.
100. Id. at 1023–30.
101. Other commentators have proposed models of discrimination with similarities to the
game-theoretic model presented here. David Swinton has analyzed racial discrimination in labor markets as a simple three-player (noncooperative) game involving employers, white employees, and minority employees. Swinton, supra note 29. Jennifer Roback has proposed a
rent-seeking model of discrimination involving “psychic rents” resulting from a taste for discrimination as well as traditional economic rents. Roback II, supra note 44. More recently,
Eric Posner has analyzed discrimination against an out-group as a means of signaling willingness to cooperate with members of the in-group. E. POSNER, supra note 26.
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profession, alma mater, etc. The existence of a group does not necessarily cause everyone who is not a member of the group to believe he
is low-status. For example, I derive status from being a resident of
San Francisco and may believe that San Franciscans are better, more
cultured, etc., than, say, Los Angelenos, but Los Angelenos do not
therefore believe they are low-status. Status seeking becomes a problem when it is combined with rent seeking by one of the groups
and/or an attempt to form economic or political coalitions at the
expense of the other group. The out-group becomes “low-status” in
large part because it receives a smaller share of the economic pie than
the in-group.
Second, McAdams’s theory does not, by itself, explain why certain traits—race and gender, for example—are used for status-seeking
so frequently. In fact, on its face, McAdams’s theory applies only to
race. In order to determine whether traits other than race should
form the basis for suspect classifications, it is useful to understand
why certain types of traits are used as the basis for subordination.
The rent-seeking model described in this paper addresses this issue as
a function of the cost of building and maintaining stable coalitions
and using them for rent-seeking purposes.102
3. Relationship of the game-theoretic model to other theories of
discrimination
The rent-seeking model implies a slightly different approach
from those of Ely103 and Ackerman.104 As under Ely’s approach, “wethey” distinctions are an important part of the rent-seeking model.
Members of the majority coalition (“we”) make distinctions that
benefit them at the expense of the minority (“they”). Thus, stereotypical generalizations about members of the out-group are likely to
be those that support legislation protecting advantages enjoyed by
the in-group. For example, a stereotype that women are not constitutionally equipped to engage in certain occupations reduces competition for those jobs and protects the male workers who currently oc102. With those caveats in place, McAdams’s theory is similar to that presented in this
article. In fact, the game-theoretic model presented here can be applied to any zero-sum bargaining game, so it applies to a status-seeking situation to the extent status is zero-sum—that
is, to the extent increased status for an in-group comes at the expense of the status of the outgroup.
103. See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
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cupy them. However, the rent-seeking model can provide some
guidance, which Ely does not, as to what it means for a trait to be
“racelike” in the sense that it is used for subordination. The qualities
that make a trait racelike are discussed in more detail in Part III.B.1,
below.
A coalitional model acts as a partial rebuttal to Ackerman’s public
choice theory argument. Under ordinary circumstances, small, welldefined interest groups can bargain with other groups and end up in
a winning coalition a fair percentage of the time. However, when a
trait provides an easy way to distinguish a stable majority from a stable minority, the minority, even if well-defined, may find its attempts
to play the democratic bargaining game blocked by the majority.
Under these circumstances, a discrete and insular minority can be
subject to long-term subordination.
The game-theoretic model presented in this paper is fundamentally different from a model based on taste or on statistical discrimination. Unlike Becker’s theory, this model assumes no preexisting
taste for avoiding association with members of a particular group. Instead, it assumes that discrimination arises and is perpetuated because
it benefits, or appears to benefit, those in the majority. Once coalitions form around a certain trait, discrimination based on that trait
becomes a social norm. An apparent “taste for discrimination” beyond one that benefits the majority can be explained either as a taste
for compliance with an existing social norm105 or as a psychological
consequence of the formation of an in-group and an out-group.
The game-theoretic model is also different from a model based
on statistical discrimination. Under this model, a trait need not be
associated with any other undesirable qualities, and in fact, discrimination can arise even if members of the majority and minority are regarded as equally productive. Differences in productivity may arise
when rent seeking occurs if, for example, the minority is restricted
from opportunities to build human capital through education. As
discussed in more detail below, stereotypes about productivity may
function as rationalizations for rent-seeking legislation. For example,
stereotypes about women’s ability to perform certain types of jobs
may be a means of protecting from competition the men who hold

105. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28.
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those jobs.106 Stereotypes may also be a psychological consequence of
the formation of an in-group and out-group.107
Other economic models of discrimination are similar to the
game-theoretic model presented here. McAdams’s status-seeking
model, for example, can be incorporated into a rent-seeking model
because status is a form of “psychic rent.”108 To the extent status is
zero-sum—that is, status for the majority is gained at the expense of
the status of the minority—the cooperative game outlined in Part II
applies to status seeking as well as ordinary rent seeking.109
More recently, Eric Posner has modeled discrimination as a
means of signaling willingness to cooperate in a repeated game.110
That is, a member of the majority discriminates against a minority in
order to signal willingness to cooperate with other members of the
majority. Under Posner’s theory, people complying with a social
norm favoring discrimination receive a benefit in the form of
stronger cooperative relationships with desired cooperative partners.111 While Posner analyzes discrimination as a noncooperative
game, in which people act individually rather than as a group, his
model has some of the same implications as a coalitional approach. If
a majority coalition seeks rent at the expense of a minority, discrimination might signal a willingness to cooperate with the majority
rather than defecting and accepting a potentially better offer from
the minority. Furthermore, because the existing structure can be
supported by a “punishment” strategy that punishes members of the
majority that cooperate with members of the minority, people might

106. See supra Part II.D.3. Stereotypes may also simply be a psychological outgrowth of
the creation of an in-group and out-group. See generally TAJFEL, supra note 23.
107. See TAJFEL, supra note 23, at 143–61.
108. See Roback II, supra note 44, at 673–75; see also McAdams, supra note 27, at 1019–
20.
109. McAdams himself suggests that status seeking is a zero-sum game and expressly
analogizes it to rent-seeking behavior:
[R]acial status preferences inherently conflict. Race discrimination exists because
members of (at least) one race seek for their group a status position that is incompatible with the position sought by members of one or more other groups. Even
when only one group seeks superiority, if the other group seeks equality, the struggle for social status is zero sum. Consequently, the appropriation of status by subordinating behavior is, like theft, a mere wealth transfer; the gain to the discriminator is at
least matched by the loss to the victim.
McAdams, supra note 27, at 1075–76 (emphasis added).
110. E. POSNER, supra note 26, at 133–47.
111. Id. at 133–34.
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discriminate in order to avoid punishment. 112 In this case, discrimination acts as a signal of compliance with the existing equilibrium.113
B. Suspect Classifications Under a Rent-Seeking Model
Current Equal Protection doctrine operates by identifying classifications along certain lines (like race) as suspect114 and subjecting
them to a higher degree of scrutiny than classifications based on
other traits. This raises a natural question—what traits other than
race invoke heightened scrutiny? A rent-seeking model suggests that
some classifications can have the effect of subordinating a particular
group by creating a stable majority coalition. At the same time, some
degree of rent seeking is inevitable in a democracy and is not constitutionally problematic. This section argues that one purpose of suspect-classification jurisprudence is to identify traits that are particularly likely to be used for subordination—that is, traits likely to be
used as a focal point in forming a stable rent-seeking coalition.
The Supreme Court has not articulated a single test for determining whether a trait gives rise to a suspect classification. A group’s
status as a discrete and insular minority within the meaning of
Carolene Products is just one of several criteria that the Court has
weighed when analyzing suspect classifications in various contexts.
First, it examines whether a class is a discrete and insular minority
“relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”115 Second, it considers whether a class possesses “‘an immutable

112. See supra Part II.B; E. POSNER, supra note 26, at 138–39 (noting that members of
the in-group “often avoid, shun, or even attack” those who cooperate with members of the
out-group).
113. Radical theorists have proposed another economic model of discrimination that is
akin to a game-theoretic model. For example, Michael Reich has proposed that racial antagonism between white workers and black workers benefits, and is promoted by, employers. Under this model, employers discriminate in order to prevent a coalition between white and black
workers. See generally MICHAEL REICH, RACIAL INEQUALITY: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1981); cf. David Swinton, supra note 29 (analyzing the labor market as a bargaining game involving employer, white employees, and black employees).
114. The Supreme Court has identified both “suspect” classes, which give rise to strict
scrutiny, and a separate set of “quasi-suspect” classes, which give rise to an intermediate level
of scrutiny. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 325 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to women and illegitimates as “quasi-suspect” classes). For the purpose of the
following discussion, I do not distinguish between suspect and quasi-suspect classifications.
115. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
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characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth.’”116 Third, it
determines whether the class has been subjected to a “‘history of
purposeful unequal treatment.’”117 Finally, it considers whether the
trait used to define the class “frequently bears no relation to ability
to perform or contribute to society.”118
These criteria make sense if discrimination is analyzed as a form
of long-term coalitional rent seeking. As will be described in more
detail, it is difficult to form stable coalitions around a mutable trait
because the composition of the majority and minority coalitions
would change over time. Because of the strategic incentive to form
long-term coalitions where possible, a minority coalition can be relegated to a “position of political powerlessness,”119 and this lack of
power can give rise to the need for judicial intervention. Finally, a
history of purposeful unequal treatment can show that a trait is being
used as a focal point in a rent-seeking game. Thus, the majority of
the Court’s criteria for determining when a trait gives rise to a suspect class ties naturally to a rent-seeking model.120
The following Part proposes an approach to determining
whether a certain group is a “discrete and insular minority” within
the sense of being easy to exclude from coalitions with other groups.
It argues that a trait’s likely use as a focal point for coalition formation should be a central part of the determination of whether that
trait should be deemed a suspect classification and identifies several
factors that bear on this inquiry. I do not argue that all of these factors must be met for a classification to be suspect; not even race

116. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); see Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974).
117. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
at 28).
118. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985)
(quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686).
119. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
120. The final criterion, the relevance of the trait to the purported purpose of the law
making the classification, does not relate directly to a rent-seeking model except to the obvious
extent that rent seeking can create an incentive to classify based on a trait that is irrelevant to
any other purpose. Under a rent-seeking model, the relevance criterion may relate not to
whether a trait is a good candidate for rent seeking—and, thus, should invoke a higher level of
scrutiny—but rather to the particular level of scrutiny the court uses. For example, both race
and gender have historically been used as basis for rent seeking. Gender classifications are given
intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, because gender is deemed to be more often
relevant to legitimate government purposes. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S.
464 (1981); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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clearly satisfies all of them. Instead, they provide a means of determining a group’s likely ability to form coalitions with other groups,
and they also provide a way to tie this inquiry to other criteria, like a
trait’s immutability, that courts have used to determine whether a
trait is suspect.121
1. Qualities of a trait likely to be used to form stable rent-seeking
coalitions
A trait is likely to be used for long-term rent seeking if it supports the creation of stable coalitions. It should lend itself to lowcost formation and maintenance of a majority coalition. It should
provide a bright line between members and nonmembers and be stable over time. That is, it should be difficult for members of the minority coalition to enter the majority coalition and vice versa. Finally,
the coalition should be one that can feasibly be used for rent-seeking
purposes. For example, it should be easy to determine whether a person is a member of the majority or minority. These criteria suggest
that a trait used for rent seeking—call it a “suspect trait”—is likely to
have most of the following characteristics. First, the trait should be
immutable in the sense that the memberships of the majority and
minority should be subject to little change over time. Second, it
should be evident whether a person is a member of the majority or
minority. Third, the trait should be discrete in that it divides society
into two or more separate groups rather than defining a continuum.
Fourth, the size of the minority group created by the trait must be
large enough that it makes it worthwhile for the majority to seek rent
from it. And finally, a history of discrimination based on that trait
might make that trait more salient and thus more likely to serve as a
focal point for future coalition building.
a. Immutable. Courts have long accepted that an immutable trait
is particularly likely to be used for invidious discrimination. Under a
rent-seeking model, an immutable trait is likely to be used to form a
stable coalition for two reasons. First, members of the majority are
121. I also am not advocating that only laws that actually seek rent from a minority be
subject to strict scrutiny. Many laws that classify people may—even if they do not themselves
seek rent directly—support a system of subordination that benefits a majority at the expense of
a minority. For example, laws that segregate members of different groups do not necessarily
seek rent on their face but act in the long run to diminish a minority’s educational, career, and
political opportunities. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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unlikely to become members of the subordinated group. As Lynn
Stout points out, “While a white male of English descent born into
wedlock in the United States may become poor, old, or handicapped, there is no chance he will become black, female, Greek, illegitimate, or an alien.” 122 Thus, discrimination on the basis of race
seems more likely than, for example, discrimination against the elderly because everyone (assuming he lives long enough) will one day
be a member of the group subject to discrimination based on age.123
Second, members of the minority are unlikely to become members of the majority. Indeed, discrimination on the basis of a freely
mutable trait would simply cause people to change that trait.124 Even
if a trait were not freely mutable, limited mutability would, over
time, dilute the rent available to the majority as members of the minority enter the majority coalition. Thus, long-term subordination of
attorneys, for example, would be difficult because eventually no one
would choose to become an attorney.
Traits may have several levels of immutability. First, a trait may
be completely immutable in the sense that no member of the majority coalition can ever become a member of the minority and vice
versa. Race and, for practical purposes, gender are examples of this.
Because these traits give rise to extremely stable in-groups and outgroups, they are obvious candidates for the type of rent seeking described in this article. Second, a trait may be inward-immutable,
meaning that no member of the out-group can become a member of
the in-group. Discrimination against the elderly or disabled are examples of discrimination based on inward-immutable traits. Finally, a
trait may be outward-immutable, meaning that no member of the ingroup can become a member of the out-group. Youth and alienage
are examples of outward-immutable traits. Traits that are completely
immutable would seem like more natural candidates for rent seeking
than traits that are immutable in only one direction. Traits that are
immutable in neither direction are less likely to be used for rent seeking.
Some traits that are not truly immutable in any of these senses
122. Stout, supra note 9, at 1817; see also Roback II, supra note 44, at 675.
123. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (“[E]ven old age
does not define a ‘discrete and insular’ group in need of ‘extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.’ Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out
our normal span.” (citation omitted)).
124. E. POSNER, supra note 26, at 134.
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may have some degree of immutability because they are difficult to
change in practice due to societal barriers or because they are important to a person’s identity. For example, poverty is not immutable in
a strict sense, but socioeconomic forces may make it difficult for the
poor to break out of the cycle of poverty. Religion and sexual orientation may be difficult to change because they are so important to a
person’s identity.125 A trait that is mutable only at a cost could be
used as the basis for rent seeking to a limited extent. If the cost of
changing a trait is sufficiently high—higher than the difference between the rent accruing to a member of the minority and a member
of the majority—a member of the minority will not have sufficient
incentive to alter that trait and will remain the subject of rent seeking.
Finally, a trait that is not inherently immutable can be made
functionally immutable by imposing legal barriers on change. For example, social class is not inherently immutable, but a legal regime
like hereditary nobility or a strict caste system can operate to make it
so. Similarly, wealth is not immutable, but a legal regime can make it
difficult to change by, for example, restricting access to human capital through education. By adopting legal rules that stabilize traits
that are the basis for coalition formation, a majority coalition can increase its stability.
b. Evident. A trait is easier to use for coalition formation if it is
evident, that is, if it is easy to determine who has the trait and who
does not. An evident trait makes it easy to determine who is a member of the in-group and who is a member of the out-group, allowing
coalition formation at low cost. An evident trait also may tend to
provide a psychological focal point for coalition formation, making a
coalition based on that trait more stable.126 An evident trait is easy to
use for rent seeking because it is easy to determine who to favor and
who to disfavor. For example, employment discrimination based on
race is easier than employment discrimination based on legitimacy
because a job candidate’s race is evident and his legitimacy or illegitimacy is not. Finally, an evident trait might make a punishment
strategy more effective because it makes it easy to see when a mem125. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (homosexuality),
vacated and aff’d on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (1989) (en banc). Discrimination based on
these types of traits could be analyzed under the fundamental rights branch of Equal Protection analysis even if these traits do not give rise to suspect classifications.
126. See E. POSNER, supra note 26, at 135; Roback II, supra note 44, at 676.

89

2ROY.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/23/02 10:18 AM

[2002

ber of the majority defects and cooperates with a member of the minority.
For these reasons, courts have recognized that a trait’s observability may make it more likely to be used for invidious discrimination. For example, in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Supreme Court
held that classifications based on gender, like those based on race,
are inherently suspect, in part because of gender’s obviousness: “[I]t
can hardly be doubted that, in part because of the high visibility of
the sex characteristic, women still face pervasive . . . discrimination in
our educational institutions, in the job market and . . . in the political arena.”127
Like immutability, a trait’s evidence can be manipulated through
law. Historically, members of a majority have occasionally tried to
make unobservable traits evident in order to accord reduced status to
people with those traits. For example, in Nazi Germany prisoners
were marked with colored triangles corresponding to the reasons for
their incarceration. A green triangle marked its wearer as a regular
criminal, and a red triangle denoted a political prisoner. Jewish prisoners were marked with two overlapping yellow triangles forming a
star of David, and homosexuals were marked with a pink triangle.
Homosexuals bearing a pink triangle were assigned to the most difficult labor.128 Similarly, while wealth is not inherently observable, in
the past, law and/or social custom dictated the clothing and behavior of different classes of society, making them readily identifiable.129
c. Discrete. A trait is a good candidate for coalition formation if it
divides society into separate groups, rather than forming a continuum. There are two reasons for this. First, discreteness eliminates the
127. 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (examining whether class composed of parent, children, and siblings “exhibit[s] obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group”).
128. Erwin J. Haeberle, Swastika, Pink Triangle, and Yellow Star: The Destruction of Sexology and the Persecution of Homosexuals in Nazi Germany, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY:
RECLAIMING THE GAY & LESBIAN PAST 365, 376 (Martin Bauml Duberman et al. eds.,
1989).
129. For example, sumptuary laws in medieval and renaissance Europe reserved certain
types of clothing materials, like silk, ermine, and pearls, to certain classes of nobility. In nineteenth-century Turkey, different ethnic and religious groups were required to wear different
styles of hat: Greeks wore dark caps; Armenians, balloon-shaped headdresses; Jews wore brimless caps; and Turks, a red fez. Even stricter laws existed in Japan, regulating in detail the dress
and behavior of people at all levels of society. Elizabeth B. Hurlock, Sumptuary Law, in
DRESS, ADORNMENT, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 295–301 (Mary Ellen Roach & Joanne Bubolz Eicher eds., 1965).
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need to negotiate where the line should be drawn between the ingroup and out-group, making coalition formation more straightforward and, presumably, less costly. Second, like an evident trait, a discrete trait allows easy determination of who is a member of the ingroup and who is in the out-group, making it easier to discriminate
based on that trait.130
Gender, alienage, and illegitimacy are examples of discrete traits.
Disability, on the other hand, is not discrete because a wide range of
types and degrees of disability exist. Race is not a discrete trait because many people—Tiger Woods being a notable example—are a
mixture of different ethnicities in various proportions. However, law
and custom have functioned historically to keep race discrete. For
example, the “one-drop rule” in the United States essentially reduced the spectrum of mixtures of European and African-American
ethnicities into two categories: white and non-white.131 Laws banning interracial marriage served a similar purpose. 132 Even today,
controversy rages about how to categorize people of mixed race,
with many arguing for a limited number of categories.133
d. Group size. The size of a minority group may bear on its likely
use as a focal point for rent seeking. First, a group is unlikely to be
the subject of subordination if it has a majority of political power.
While a group with the majority of power may be the subject of
some rent seeking—by a small, well-organized lobby, for example—
it can flex its political muscle if a political minority tries to deprive it
of significant benefits. As described above, however, a group can be a
numerical majority and still lack the majority of power in the sense of
ability to affect political outcomes. For example, a numerical minority within a jurisdiction could control the majority of the wealth—
and thus form a majority of the tax base, spend more money on advertising and lobbying, etc.—and, therefore, have more power than
simple numbers would indicate.
Second, a trait is likely to be used for long-term rent seeking if

130. Eric Posner has noted this phenomenon in relation to a signaling model of discrimination. See E. POSNER, supra note 26, at 136.
131. Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, THE NEW YORKER, July 24, 1994, at *3,
available at http://www.afn.org/~dks/race/wright.html.
132. See Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989) (discussing miscegenation laws).
133. See Nathaniel Persily, Color by Numbers: Race, Redistricting, and the 2000 Census,
85 MINN. L. REV. 899 (2001).
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the minority coalition it creates is large enough that the rent that can
be extracted from it is larger—or at least not significantly smaller—
than the amount of rent that can be gained by forming coalitions
around different traits. This is akin to the observation that an optimal
strategy in the divide-the-dollar game is to form a minimum winning
coalition so that the maximal amount of rent can be extracted and
distributed to the smallest possible majority. For example, as noted
above, discrimination in the allocation of school funds in the Jim
Crow South was particularly severe in the counties with the largest
minority population.134 On the other hand, institutionalized rent
seeking against a very small minority—people more than seven feet
tall, for example—is unlikely because the percentage of people in the
minority coalition would be so small that the cost of forming and
maintaining coalitions around this trait would be greater than the
amount of rent that could be obtained.135
e. History of discrimination. Finally, since the equilibrium strategy
that players will choose depends on the coalitional structure that exists at the beginning of a game, a history of discrimination based on
a certain trait can make that trait more likely to be used for rent seeking. As described above, a prior division of people into groups—even
a completely arbitrary one—can affect subsequent decisions about
preferred coalition partners. Members of an identifiable group tend
to prefer forming coalitions with other members of that group and
distributing resources to members of that group.136 If, for example,
race has been used in the past as a means of categorizing people, it is
more likely to serve as a natural focal point for coalition formation in
the future. Because race, ethnicity, and gender have long been used
as means of distinguishing people from one another, these traits are
likely to serve as natural focal points. 137

134. See supra notes 44–60 and accompanying text.
135. A minority of significant size may also suffer a higher degree of discrimination because it is seen as greater competition for scarce resources—like jobs—than a small minority.
See HUBERT M. BLALOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS 143–73
(1967).
136. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
137. Other factors may bear on the likelihood of a trait being used as a focal point for
coalition formation. For example, the proximity of members of the majority and minority to
one another may also have an effect on coalition formation. People may be more likely to enter
into coalitions with people with whom they have regular contact, like family, friends, and geographic community. Similarly, to the extent rent seeking is intergenerational, a trait that is inherited might tend to support coalitions that are stable from generation to generation.
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2. Application to selected traits other than race and gender
a. Alienage. Alienage has been recognized as a suspect classification,138 although the Court has applied strict scrutiny more deferentially in cases involving aliens than in those involving race.139
Alienage seems like a good candidate for formation of rent-seeking
coalitions. Alienage is inward-immutable because a citizen is extremely unlikely to become an alien. Alienage is outward-mutable
only with the consent of the state, so the majority coalition can control the extent to which aliens join the majority by becoming citizens. Alienage is discrete because a person either is or is not a U.S.
citizen. Although alienage is not inherently evident, citizens of other
countries can sometimes be identified by language or ethnicity. Furthermore, proof of citizenship is required for jobs, so alienage is
made evident in the labor market, a principal arena for rent seeking.
Finally, aliens have no vote, making them especially vulnerable to political rent seeking.
Furthermore, alienage has been used historically, and is used today, for rent seeking. Under current law, aliens can be prohibited
from certain types of jobs140 and are ineligible for certain government
benefits.141 Undocumented aliens are routinely hired to work long
hours for subminimum wages.142 In certain cases they have been held
in virtual slavery, held on an employer’s premises, subjected to physical abuse, and threatened with serious harm if they leave their jobs.143
b. Illegitimacy. Illegitimacy has also been recognized as a quasisuspect classification giving rise to an intermediate level of scru-

138. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
139. E.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (holding that state may bar employment of aliens as state troopers); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (finding that Congress
may impose conditions on alien’s participation in Medicare).
140. See Foley, 435 U.S. 291.
141. See Mathews, 426 U.S. 67.
142. See, e.g., Hidden in the Home: Abuse of Domestic Workers with Special Visas in the
United States, 13 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH No. 2(G) (June 2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/usadom/usadom0501.pdf [hereinafter Hidden in the
Home]; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Inspection Report: Immigration and Naturalization Service Efforts to Combat Harboring and Employing Illegal Aliens in Sweatshops, Rep. Num. I-96-08
(May 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/i9608/i9608toc.htm; U.S. Dep’t of
State, International Information Programs: Motivation of Chinese Illegal Aliens, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/chinaaliens/why.htm.
143. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 142, at *3; Hidden in the Home, supra note
142, at 19–22.
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tiny.144 However, unlike alienage, illegitimacy does not seem like a
good candidate for rent seeking. Legitimacy is immutable, because it
is determined by accident of birth, and is discrete. However, it is not
evident, so it is unlikely to serve as a focal point for coalition building
and is also difficult to use as a means of seeking rents. For example,
an employer ordinarily has no way to determine whether an applicant
was born in wedlock. Finally, while nonmarital children have been
the subjects of rent seeking—for example, some states have prohibited them from inheriting by intestate succession145—they have not
been the persistent targets of discrimination in the same way as
women and racial minorities.
c. Religion. The Supreme Court has not held religion to be a
suspect classification, although lower courts have occasionally assumed in dicta that it is one.146 On its face, religion does not appear
to be a likely candidate for rent seeking. Religion is mutable at will,
although changing religion may involve very high costs since religion
is often central to a person’s identity. Religion is not evident. It may
be discrete to the extent most people are not members of more than
one religion, although religious beliefs can exist in various degrees
among members of a given religion. Therefore, religion does not
look like an obvious candidate for coalition formation.
Yet religion plainly has been used for this purpose throughout
history, and religious minorities have been the subject of rent seeking. Why has religion been used in this way? Several potential explanations exist. First, in some cases religion may be used as a surrogate
for other truly immutable traits, like national origin or ethnicity. For

144. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
145. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
146. See, e.g., Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If the statute employs a suspect class (such as race, religion, or national origin) . . . .”); Williams v. Scott, 142
F.3d 441, No. 97-1223, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6556, at *7 (7th Cir. Mar. 26, 1998) (“The
placement of Williams in medical segregation on the basis of his religion, a suspect classification, would require that it be analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard.”); Pinnacle Nursing
Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306, 1317 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Since suspect classifications such as
race, religion, or national origin are not involved here, we apply the ‘traditional’ equal protection analysis.”); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(“Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities.” (citations omitted)). But see
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (holding conscientious objectors on religious grounds not a suspect class). Courts have not been required to address whether religion
is a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause because suits involving religious
discrimination have ordinarily been brought under the Free Exercise Clause.
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example, prejudice against Muslims may be a surrogate for prejudice
against people of Arab ancestry. This is not true for all discrimination
based on religion. For example, stable coalitions have formed around
religion in Ireland even though Irish Catholics and Protestants share
a common ethnicity. Second, although formation of coalitions
around religion involves higher transaction costs than formation
around, say, race, in societies that are racially homogeneous, religion
may simply be the most efficient basis for stable, long-term rent seeking. Since social groups in those societies may already form around
religion, religion may provide an easy focal point for coalition formation.
Finally, some discrimination based on religion may be due to factors other than rent seeking. Laws or practices that discriminate
based on religion can occur for several reasons. Some practices, like
public funding of parochial schools, teaching about a majority religion in public schools, or allowing public religious displays, may provide a benefit to a favored religion.147 These are akin to classic rent
seeking. Others may be intended to discourage the practice of a minority religion—or at least have that effect—without providing a
benefit to other religions.148 These have an entirely different function, as they simply attempt to discourage the practice of a disfavored
religion. The latter type of discrimination does not fit within a rentseeking model and so is beyond the scope of this article, although it
could be subject to heightened scrutiny under an antidiscrimination
or individual rights analysis.149
d. Age and disability. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,150 the
Supreme Court reiterated its earlier holding that age is not a suspect
classification. The Court noted explicitly that age is inward-mutable
because all of us, assuming we live long enough, will experience old

147. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (examining display of
nativity scene in public courthouse); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (concerning
teaching “creation science” in public schools); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (involving tax deduction for spending on parochial school). All of these cases were decided under the
Establishment Clause, rather than the Equal Protection Clause.
148. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (involving law banning animal sacrifice); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (scrutinizing law banning use of peyote). These cases were decided under the Free Exercise Clause, rather than the Equal Protection Clause.
149. This is particularly easy in the case of religion, because a specific Constitutional
guarantee makes the free exercise of religion a fundamental right.
150. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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age.151 Age is evident, but is not discrete, because age forms a spectrum rather than dividing people into separate categories. Thus, coalitions formed around age are likely to be less inherently stable than
coalitions formed around race and gender. The elderly have not suffered a “history of purposeful unequal treatment” akin to discrimination based on race or gender.152 Finally, as a practical matter, the elderly have not shown any difficulty forming coalitions in political
bargaining situations. In fact, the American Association of Retired
Persons is regarded as one of the most powerful lobbies in the
United States.153
Disability has been held not to be a suspect classification for similar reasons.154 Disability is inward-mutable, because any person might
unexpectedly become disabled. Disability may be (but is not always)
evident and is not discrete because many types and levels of disability
exist.155 Finally, as the Supreme Court noted in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, the disabled are not “politically powerless in
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the
lawmakers.”156
e. Homosexuality. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue directly, circuit courts have held homosexuality is
not a suspect classification.157 The extent to which homosexuality is
immutable has been the subject of much scientific and academic debate; the prevailing view being that it is immutable in some people
but not others.158 Homosexuality is neither evident nor does it divide
151. Id. at 83; see Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
152. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
153. See, e.g., The Power 25: Top Lobbying Groups, FORTUNE, May 2001, available at
http://www.fortune.com/lists/power25/.
154. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441–47 (1985).
155. The Cleburne court noted this with respect to the mentally retarded: “Nor are they
all cut from the same pattern: . . . they range from those whose disability is not immediately
evident to those who must be constantly cared for.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
156. Id. at 445.
157. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 1998); Richenberg v.
Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260–61 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir.
1996); cf. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding homosexuality to be a suspect classification), vacated and aff’d on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699
(1989) (en banc). Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), with Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
158. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of
the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994). As noted above, however, a
trait that is mutable only at great cost might still be used for rent-seeking purposes.
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people into discrete groups, since hetero- and homosexuality may exist in varying degrees in different people. Homosexuality does not
appear to be a likely basis for formation of stable rent-seeking coalitions.
Why then, does discrimination based on homosexuality occur?
Homosexuality might be analyzed in a similar way to religion, another trait that is not necessarily evident, is not always immutable,
but is important to individual identity. Discrimination based on homosexuality may have one (or both) of two causes: It may provide a
benefit to a favored sexual orientation that is denied to homosexuals,
or it may impose a penalty on the practice of homosexuality in order
to discourage it. Laws barring same-sex marriage or prohibiting homosexuals from serving in the military fall into the first category.
These laws and other laws, such as those prohibiting sodomy, fall
into the second. However, the principal effect of even laws in the
first category, like those prohibiting identified homosexuals from
serving in the military, is to drive homosexual behavior underground. Thus, discrimination based on homosexuality probably is
not explained well by a rent-seeking model and might be better analyzed under an antidifferentiation theory or theory of fundamental
rights.159
C. Affirmative Action and “Reverse Discrimination”
So-called “reverse discrimination” occurs when a suspect trait
(race, for example) is used to provide benefits to the minority, rather
than the majority. To date, the Supreme Court has invalidated racial
classifications that benefit a minority as well as those that benefit the
majority.160 This area, though, remains very controversial. How
would the question be analyzed using a game-theoretic model?
The straightforward answer is the same answer dictated by other
process-oriented theories of Equal Protection—that discrimination
against a stable majority should not be subject to strict scrutiny.
However, the reasoning behind this conclusion depends on how we
characterize the political process leading to affirmative action-type

159. See Pamela S. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Justice
Blackmun, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 59, 63–64 (1998) (proposing “double-barreled” judicial review tying together liberty and equality interests).
160. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (race-based preferences in hiring contractors); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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results. Under one view—probably the most supportable—
affirmative action is essentially the opposite of rent seeking; that is, it
occurs when the majority itself agrees to provide a benefit to the minority. Under a view that the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
is to prevent a stable political majority from subordinating a stable
political minority, this does not present a problem. Laws that are intended to aid a minority do not subordinate it.
Under another view of the political process, affirmative action is
the result of a minority successfully creating a majority coalition that
supports affirmative action by recruiting some of the (historical) majority coalition. Under this view, not only is the minority not being
exploited by the majority, it is part of the majority. Assuming that
the minority is a racial minority, this indicates that coalitions are
forming along the lines of some factor other than race and, thus, that
the political process is working as intended. In this case, as before,
no reason exists to subject this sort of law to strict scrutiny.161
D. The Role of Equal Protection Law
A game-theoretic model of discrimination provides important
lessons for the role of Equal Protection law in remedying specific acts
of discrimination and in making discrimination less likely to occur in
the long run. This model makes more explicit the Carolene Products
notion that the democratic process can break down under certain
situations, leaving a minority a persistent loser in rent-seeking situations. In a repeated cooperative bargaining game, players have an incentive, if possible, to form a stable majority coalition to seek rent at
the expense of a stable minority. In this sort of situation, the idealized bargaining process envisioned in the Calculus of Consent,162 in
which players ordinarily are able to enter winning coalitions a fair
percentage of the time, does not work properly. Because a stable minority ordinarily cannot get recourse through the legislative process,
the judiciary may appropriately step in and strike down legislation
that discriminates against the stable minority. By doing this, the judiciary can reduce the opportunities for the majority to seek rent at
161. It is worth noting, though, a counterargument that arises from the game-theoretic
model. To the extent race (or any other trait) acts as a focal point for coalition formation, any
type of discrimination based on race, including reverse discrimination, might reinforce an existing focal point. As described below, eliminating the use of certain traits as focal points for coalition formation is an important function of Equal Protection law.
162. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 148–52.
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the expense of the minority.
In the longer run, Equal Protection law may have an even more
important function. Under a rent-seeking model, discrimination becomes persistent because it becomes a focal point for coalition formation and hence becomes internalized by society as a social norm.
By eliminating possibilities for rent seeking, or by at least making
rent seeking more difficult (raising transaction costs), Equal Protection law can eliminate the purpose of discrimination as a focal point.
If a stable majority cannot seek benefits for itself at the expense of a
minority, a strategy that involves forming a long-term stable coalition will not be an equilibrium strategy. Instead, players will likely
play something like an opportunistic strategy, entering into whatever
coalition seems likely to provide the greatest short-term gain. Under
this equilibrium, over time each player is likely to be able to join a
majority coalition a fair percentage of the time. Thus, a function of
Equal Protection law is to eliminate focal point strategies that subordinate a minority.
Over the even longer run, Equal Protection law can play a role in
identifying and preventing new types of discrimination as they arise.
Why would we expect new types of discrimination to arise? Equal
Protection law can help eliminate the incentive to form a particular
stable rent-seeking coalition—by prohibiting discrimination along
the lines of whatever trait serves as the basis for the coalition—but it
does not eliminate the incentive to form a stable majority coalition
generally. That is, if discrimination based on a particular trait is
eliminated as a focal point, rent-seeking coalitions might arise based
on some other trait. For example, a reduction in rent-seeking opportunities based on race could result in people trying to seek rent using
other forms of discrimination: on the basis of religion, homosexuality, or some other trait. Thus, over the long run the list of suspect
classifications should be treated as flexible and subject to change in
the event that traits other than those recognized become the subject
of persistent discrimination.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article proposes a game-theoretic model of discrimination
that focuses on a group’s ability to form coalitions with other
groups. It models the democratic process as a cooperative bargaining
game in which players can form coalitions with other players. When
this game is repeated, players have an incentive to maintain a stable
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majority coalition to seek a long-term advantage for themselves at
the expense of the excluded minority. The coalition that players will
choose to form will likely be a focal point coalition that is particularly
salient for some reason.
This model provides a natural way to analyze whether a group is
a “discrete and insular minority” within the meaning of Carolene
Products. A discrete and insular minority is likely to be formed
around a trait that is a natural focal point for the formation and
maintenance of stable majority and minority coalitions. This article
identifies several qualities that such a trait is likely to possess: it is
likely to be immutable, to be evident, to divide society into easily
separable groups that are each of a significant size, and to have a history of use for discrimination. These qualities provide a means of determining whether a trait constitutes a suspect classification warranting a heightened degree of scrutiny. This article argues that Equal
Protection law can not only prevent individual acts of discrimination,
but, over time, also change social norms that favor building coalitions around certain traits. Thus, over time Equal Protection can
help reduce the amount of discrimination in society.
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Appendix A. The Definition of the Stable Set
Given a coalition S, we say that a payout allocation x = (x1, x2, . . .
, xn) is feasible for S if S has the power to obtain allocation x. For the
purposes of the three-person divide-the-dollar game, an allocation is
feasible for a coalition if (1) the coalition has at least two members,
so that it constitutes a majority, and (2) the total payout to all three
players is no greater than 1. For example, the allocation (1/3, 1/3,
1/3) is feasible for the grand coalition of all players, but the allocation (1/2, 1/2, 1/2) is not.
Allocation y dominates allocation x if some coalition S exists such
that (1) y is feasible for S and (2) S prefers y to x; that is, the payout
to each member of S is greater under allocation y than under allocation x. Intuitively, y dominates x if some group of players can do better by forming coalition S and dividing the resulting payout among
themselves. For example, in the divide-the-dollar game, Player 1 and
2 can improve upon the allocation (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) by forming the
coalition {1, 2} and dividing the dollar between themselves, yielding
the allocation (1/2, 1/2, 0).
Let V be a set of payout allocations for a cooperative game. The
set V is internally stable if no allocation in V dominates any other allocation in V. The set V is externally stable if every allocation outside
of V is dominated by an allocation in V. A set that is both internally
and externally stable is called a stable set, or a von Neumann and
Morgenstern solution.163 A stable set has some appeal as the set of
likely outcomes of a cooperative game. Any allocation outside of a
stable set V will likely be replaced by an allocation within the stable
set that dominates it. On the other hand, an allocation within V will
not be replaced by any other allocation within V and is unlikely—so
the theory goes—to be replaced by an allocation outside of V because that allocation would itself be unstable.164
As a simple example, consider the following set V of outcomes of
the divide-the-dollar game:
{(1/2, 1/2, 0), (1/2, 0, 1/2), (0, 1/2, 1/2)}

163. The concept of the stable set as the solution to a cooperative game was proposed by
John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR
MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 263–66 (4th ed. 1972).
164. See MYERSON, supra note 14, at 453.
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It is easy to check that none of these outcomes is dominated by
either of the other two outcomes within the V. Similarly, any allocation not in V must give a payout of less than 1/2 to at least two
players, and these players would prefer to form a coalition and switch
to the allocation in V that gives them both 1/2. Thus, V is both internally and externally stable.165
However, the stable set is deficient as a predictor of the likely
outcome of a cooperative game. First, many games have more than
one stable set, and some of these sets may include outcomes that
seem very unlikely. For example, in the divide-the-dollar game, given
any Player P and any number α < 1/2, the set of all allocations that
allocates the entire dollar and gives a payout of α to Player P is a stable set.166 Thus, every allocation that divides the entire dollar is in
some stable set, including allocations that seem intuitively unlikely.
We can refine the notion of a stable set in order to capture the
intuition that a minimum winning coalition is particularly likely to
form. A main-simple stable set V is a stable set such that each allocation x in it can be associated with a minimum winning coalition that
prefers x at least as much as any other outcome in V.167 The advantage of a main-simple stable set is that it is unique for a game. For
example, in the three-person divide-the-dollar game the unique
main-simple stable set is {(1/2, 1/2, 0 ), (1/2, 0, 1/2), (0, 1/2,
1/2)}.168 Political theorists commonly view this set as the set of allocations most likely to result when the divide-the-dollar game is
played once.

165.
166.
167.
168.
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Appendix B. An Equilibrium Strategy in the Repeated
Divide-the-Dollar Game
This section provides a formal analysis of the repeated divide-thedollar game and a proof of the result suggested in Part II.A.2 of the
article—that a discriminatory strategy is a stable equilibrium of the
repeated game.
In order to solve the repeated divide-the-dollar game, we impose
a plausible bargaining structure onto it, transforming it into a repeated noncooperative game. The bargaining structure takes the
form of a stage game, which is an n-player game divided into k
stages. At each stage, one or more players may have a set of actions
that he or she can take, and the players’ actions at one stage may affect the actions available to players at subsequent stages.
The divide-the-dollar game can be represented as a stage game
by imposing a simple bargaining process onto it. Assuming that
some allocation x exists at the beginning of the first stage, negotiation occurs in the following three stages:
(1) “Nature” picks one player i at random;
(2) Player i proposes an allocation y of the dollar among the
three players; and
(3) The players vote on whether to adopt y in preference to x. If
y is adopted, the players receive payout in accordance with allocation y, and y becomes the beginning payout for the next
round of the game. Otherwise, players are paid in accordance
with allocation x, and x is the starting allocation for the next
round.
We can model the repeated divide-the-dollar game by repeating
this stage game an infinite number of times. We assume that a discount factor of δ applies between rounds (the players discount future
payouts). A strategy si for player i is simply a rule that for each stage
t, describes the action that i will select—or the probability of player i
selecting a particular action—depending on the sequence of play up
to that point.
When this stage game is repeated an infinite number of times,
each player will receive a payout each round of the game. A player’s
total payout will be the discounted sum of the payouts that he receives each round. If each player i is playing some strategy si, we can
compute the total payout that a player i will get if the repeated game
begins with a given allocation x. That is, beginning with an allocation x, the game will follow a fixed path (or will have a determined
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probability of following each of a number of paths), so we can determine the total payout player i will receive by summing the payouts, discounted by probability, that he will receive each round. The
total payout to player i when the game starts from the allocation x
can be denoted by vi(x).
As defined so far, this game has many Nash equilibria. For example, given any starting allocation x, the strategy profile under which
every player always proposes x and votes only in favor of x is a Nash
equilibrium.169 If the discount factor is high enough, many allocations can be supported as stable equilibria through the use of punishment strategies. For example, a supermajority170 of m players can
play a strategy in which (1) a member of the supermajority always
proposes and always votes for an allocation in which each member of
the supermajority receives 1/m and each member of the minority receives 0, and (2) if any member of the supermajority defects, the remaining majority (the supermajority minus the defector) switches to
a strategy that is the same in every respect except that the defecting
player is treated as a member of the minority. If the discount factor is
high enough, this strategy is a Nash equilibrium.
In the interest of making the solutions to this game more plausible, we will place some—hopefully realistic—restrictions on the
strategies that players can adopt. The point here is to make the assumptions that are least likely to support discriminatory strategies.
That is, we want to determine whether stable discriminatory strategies are likely to emerge even if players have short memories and do
not explicitly distinguish among other players.171 To begin with, we
assume that all players play the “same” strategy. That is, Player 1’s
strategy beginning from the allocation (x1, x2, x3) is the same as
Player 2’s strategy beginning from (x2, x1, x3), and so forth. This
eliminates strategies in which players make distinctions among the
other players. Second, we will assume that the strategies are stationary, that is, the strategy within any subgame depends only on the
subgame’s starting allocation. In other words, players have no memory of the history of play prior to the current stage game. This elimi169. This is easy to see. No player can gain by either proposing or voting for an allocation
other than x, because such an allocation will never get the majority necessary to be adopted.
170. A supermajority is a majority plus one player. If the game has only three players, of
course, the only supermajority is the grand coalition.
171. The assumptions made here parallel those in David P. Baron & John A. Ferejohn,
Bargaining in Legislatures, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1181 (1989).
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nates the possibility of “punishment” strategies akin to the tit-for-tat
strategy in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Finally, we will assume
that the players play stage-undominated voting strategies. That is,
given a current allocation x, a player i will vote for any proposal y
such that vi(y) > vi(x). This assumption captures the intuition that
players will vote in favor of any proposal that gives them a higher
long-term payout than the current allocation.
Since we are assuming that the players’ strategies are symmetrical, we can define a strategy profile for the game by defining a strategy for a given Player i. Let V denote the main-simple stable set for
the n-person divide-the-dollar game.172 For a Player i, let Vi be the
subset of V consisting of allocations that give Player i a non-zero
payout.173 We define the “discriminatory” strategy as follows, given
starting allocation x:
Discriminatory strategy:
Proposal strategy for Player i:
If x ∈ Vi, propose that allocation. Otherwise, propose a randomly selected allocation in Vi.
Voting strategy for Player i:
If x ∈ Vi, vote only for that allocation.
Otherwise,
Always vote for any proposed y ∈ Vi.
Always vote against a proposed y ∈ V such that y ∉ Vi.
If y ∉ V, vote for y if and only if yi ≥ xi.
Proposition 2. The discriminatory strategy is a stationary, subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated n person divide-the-dollar
game, with n odd, if the discount factor δ ≥ n/(n+1).
Proof: The idea of the proof is to compute the value of various
allocations and show that no allocation has a higher long-term value
to Player 1, under any alternative strategy, than an allocation in V1.
In the remainder of this section, s will represent the strategy profile
under which all players play the discriminatory strategy, and v1(x) will
represent the total discounted payout to Player 1 in the repeated
stage game assuming that x is the starting allocation and all players
play strategy profile s. Since we will be comparing s to other strate-

172. This set consists of all allocations under which a minimum winning coalition divides
the pot equally among its members. So, for example, the set V for the three-person game is
{(½, ½, 0), (½, 0, ½), (0, ½, ½)}.
173. In the three-person case, for example, V1 = {(½, ½, 0), (½, 0, ½)}.
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gies Player 1 might play, we will let s' denote a strategy profile under
which all players other than Player 1 play the discriminatory strategy,
and Player 1 plays some other strategy. We will denote by v'1(x) the
total discounted payout to Player 1 assuming that x is the starting allocation and the players are using strategy profile s'.
The discriminatory strategy s is a subgame perfect equilibrium of
the repeated game if it is a Nash equilibrium of every induced stage
game—that is, if Player 1 cannot improve his total payout by changing his strategy in any stage. The discriminatory strategy s requires
Player 1 always to propose some x ∈ V1 and also to vote for any allocation in V1. Player 1 can improve upon s only if he can improve his
total payout by either proposing (and voting for) some y ∉ V1 instead
of x ∈ V1 or else by voting down some x ∈ V1 in order to retain an
existing allocation y ∉ V1. Thus, Player 1 can improve on the discriminatory strategy only if there exists some alternative strategy profile s' and some allocation y such that v'1(y) > v1(x) for any x ∈ V1.
We begin by calculating v1(x) for x ∈ V1. An allocation in V gives
an equal payout to each member of some minimum winning coalition. A minimum winning coalition has exactly (n + 1)/2 members,
so each member receives a payout of 2/(n + 1). Therefore, any allocation x in V1 gives Player 1 a payout of x1 = 2/(n + 1). If all players
play the discriminatory strategy, and x ∈ V1 is the starting allocation,
then x will be adopted every round of the game. Thus, the long term
value of x to Player 1 is equal to v1(x) = x1 + δx1 + δ2x1 + . . . =
x1/(1 - δ), where δ is the discount factor. So:

v  x =

n +  − δ 

for x ∈ V 

We also note that if the starting allocation x is in V but not V1,
then x will be adopted every round regardless of what Player 1 does.
Player 1 will get a payout of zero every round, and v1(x) = 0.
Now we calculate the maximal value of v'1(y) under any alterative
strategy.
Lemma 1: Let x be any allocation in V1. Assume there exists
some strategy profile s' and some y ∉ V1 such that v'1(y) > v1(x).
Then:

v  y  = y  +

δ   
v  y  + n − v  y 
n

Where y' is Player 1’s proposal under strategy s'.
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Proof of Lemma 1: We will compute the value v'1(y) by analyzing the subgame beginning with y. If y is the starting allocation,
Player 1 gets an immediate payout of y1. The subgame starting with
allocation y can proceed in three ways:
(1) Player 1 is selected as the proposer (a 1/n chance). Then
Player 1 will propose allocation y'. We can assume y' will be approved, because otherwise Player 1 would gain nothing from playing
it. The continuation value to Player 1 = δv'1(y').
(2) Some other Player i is selected as proposer (a chance of (n +
1)/n). Player i will propose an allocation x in V that gives Player i a
non-zero payout. There are two possibilities:
(a) x ∈ V1 (1/2 chance). Then Player 1 will vote against x, since
by hypothesis y is better for him than x. So x will be voted down, and
y will remain in effect. The continuation value to Player 1 is δv'1(y).
(b) x ∉ V1 (1/2 chance). Then x will be approved, since Player
1’s vote is not required for its approval. Then, since x will be approved in every subsequent round as well, Player 1 will get a payout
of 0 every round. The continuation value to Player 1 is 0.
Adding the continuation values to Player 1 from each of these
outcomes, discounted by the probability of each outcome, gives the
result in Lemma 1.
Lemma 2: Let z = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) denote the allocation under
which Player 1 receives the entire dollar and all other players in the
game receive 0. Let x be any allocation in V1. If there exists y such
that v'1(y) > v1(x), then v'1(z) ≥ v'1(y).
Proof of Lemma 2: From Lemma 1 we know that v'1(y) depends only on y1 (the payout to Player 1 under allocation y), and
v'1(y') (the value of whatever proposal Player 1 makes if the existing
allocation is y and he is selected as proposer). Obviously y1 is maximized when y = z. It is also easy to see that v'1(y') is maximized when
y = z. We know that v'1(y') ≥ v'1(y), or else Player 1 would not propose y'. Thus, y' ∉ V1, and a fortiori y ∉ V. Therefore, a Player i who
is playing the “discriminatory” strategy will vote for y' if y'i ≥ yi. Obviously, this will always be the case if y = z. So if y = z, then y' will be
adopted regardless of what it is, and Player 1 can choose the y' that
gives him the highest payout. (We can see, of course, that if y = z
then y' = z also). Thus, v'1(y) is maximized if y = z, so v'1(z) ≥ v'1(y).
Proof of Proposition 2: As described above, we need to show
that, for any strategy s' that Player 1 might choose, and for any y ∉
V1, x ∈ V1, we must have v1(x) ≥ v'1(y). From Lemma 2, we know
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that the value of y is maximized if y = z. Thus, it is sufficient to show
that v1(x) ≥ v'1(z). We can compute the minimal value of v'1(z) from
the formula in Lemma 1, since we know z1 = 1 and v'1(z) is maximized when Player 1’s strategy is always to propose z.

v z  = z +






δ

n+
v z  + n − v z  =  + δ
v z 
n
n












Thus, v'1(z) is just equal to a payout stream discounted by the
factor δ (n+1) / 2n, so:

v z  =





n+
−δ
n

From the above, we know:

v x =

n +  − δ 

Solving for δ, we find that v1(x) ≥ v'1(z) whenever δ ≥ n/(n+1).
Obviously, this result becomes less meaningful as the number of
players in the game becomes large. For example, in the case of the
three-person game, the discriminatory strategy is stable whenever δ ≥
3/4. However, as n gets arbitrarily large, the discriminatory strategy
appears to be unstable (or at least not stable for purely strategic reasons) unless δ is arbitrarily close to 1. As described in the body of
this article, rent-seeking situations may be modeled as bargaining
games in which the players are a small number of groups. For example, bargaining in the employment context can be modeled as a
three-player game in which the players are the employer, majority
employees, and minority employees. Therefore, this result provides
meaningful insights into the dynamics of political bargaining situations.
In reality, as the number of players in the game becomes arbitrarily large, coalition-formation costs are likely to become a much more
important factor than purely strategic considerations. For example,
suppose that some minimum winning coalition currently exists and is
dividing the pot equally among its members. Suppose further that
Player 1 has the option of proposing some new allocation y supported by a different majority coalition. In the above proof, we assumed that Player 1 had the power to obtain the allocation (1, 0,
0, . . ., 0), under which Player 1 received the entire pot and the re108
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maining players received 0. In reality, Player 1 is unlikely to achieve
anything close to this, particularly when the number of players is
large, because other players are likely to demand at least some minimum payment in order to compensate them for the time and cost of
bargaining and for the opportunity cost of giving up the pursuit of
other outcomes. This will reduce the value of opportunistic renegotiation and make coalitions more stable once they are formed. In particular, coalition-formation costs can make the discriminatory strategy stable at lower discount factors than indicated above.
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